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SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: WHAT ARE THEY WORTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., University of Maryland, 1974
M.A., Naval Postgraduate School, 1985

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This study is an analysis of Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1974-1983. Using a focused comparison methodology, ten sub-Saharan nations are examined in light of two objectives. The first is to describe the range of military assistance relationships that existed between the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan nations during the review period. The second seeks evidence of the ability of arms transfers to assist the the Soviets in achieving political influence over client states.

The degree of similarity existing between the United Nations General Assembly voting records of the Soviet Union and recipients of Soviet military assistance is used as an indicator of political influence. The principal research hypothesis states that if the Soviet Union represents the sole or predominant supplier of military arms and equipment to a recipient country, that country will "mirror image" the Soviet Union's United Nations voting record. (See reverse side)

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This study concludes that the Soviet Union gains political influence as a result of arms transfers when recipient states are confronted with active or imminent military threats. Recipients of Soviet military assistance are unwilling to restructure military forces to align with new sources of supply for military hardware while regime survival is challenged. Therefore, African states, to include Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, find themselves obligated to meet the expectations of their Soviet patrons to ensure the continued flow of arms and military equipment.

The author states his belief that an understanding of this finding has implications for American foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than a willingness to provide sophisticated weapons to the African continent in an attempt to counter-balance Soviet transfers, the study proposes that the interests of the United States would be better served by finding means to reduce the African need for arms.

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

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

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

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

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ABSTRACT

SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: WHAT ARE THEY WORTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS?, by Major James F. Babbitt, USA, 128 pages.

This study is an analysis of Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1974 - 1983.. Using a focused comparison methodology, ten sub-Saharan nations are examined in light of two objectives. The first is to describe the range of military assistance relationships that existed between the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan nations during the review period. The second seeks evidence of the ability of arms transfers to assist the Soviets in achieving political influence over client states.

The degree of similarity existing between the United Nations General Assembly voting records of the Soviet Union and recipients of Soviet military aid is used as an indicator of political influence. The principal research hypothesis states that if the Soviet Union represents the sole or predominant supplier of military arms and equipment to a recipient country, that country will "mirror image" the Soviet Union's United Nations voting record.

The study concludes that the Soviet Union gains political influence as a result of arms transfers when recipient states are confronted with active or imminent military threats. Recipients of Soviet military assistance are unwilling to restructure military forces to align with new sources of supply for military hardware while regime survival is challenged. Therefore, African states, to include Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, find themselves obligated to meet the expectations of their Soviet patrons to ensure the continued flow of arms and military equipment.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> The primary motivation of the arms supplier is the desire to achieve political influence in the increasingly important, yet fragmented regions of the developing world. Recognizing the demand for arms as an opportunity to achieve this goal, the industrialized nations often compete without regard to long-term consequences. In fact, arms transfers have become, in many ways, the principal instrument of foreign policy in the Third World.[1]

Background

Since the middle of the 1970s, the rate of increase of military hardware within sub-Saharan Africa has been greater that any other single region of the world. In 1978, the value of Africa's arms imports was twenty-one times higher (measured in constant dollars) than ten years

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[1]Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 22.

prior.[2] Yet, with the single notable exception of the Republic of South Africa, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa are dependent upon the assistance of the more industrialized nations for the supply of military arms and equipment.

Given the serious economic difficulties that have confronted most African states since their independence, it is difficult to understand the continued growth of military capabilities and the market for arms in Africa. Many observers see cause for this aspect of African development in the actions of the suppliers of military arms. Recent research has shown however that the single most important factor for the increased trade has been the demand for arms by African nations themselves and not an aggressive pursuit of sales by suppliers.[3]

There exist as many different factors feeding the current African demand for weapons as there are African states. One principal factor is the need to replace worn and obsolete weaponry. At the time of their independence, African states were among the least militarized in the world. Few of the newly independent nations could field even marginally equipped military forces. Those weapons that had provided for national security at independence are now worn by age, outdated, or obsolete and are beyond the possibility of economic repair or modernization. Even if these states were not seeking to increase their military capabilities, they would still enter the arms market seeking to replace older weapon systems.

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[2]U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, Pubn. No. 108 (1980), p. 117.

[3]Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa, p. 28.

Prestige serves as another prime motivator for acquiring modern weapons. In many African eyes, readily visible evidence of military power is a prerequisite of national sovereignty. An armed force parading state of the art weaponry is believed to be a necessity for acceptance into the international community. As advanced systems are introduced into a region, it becomes increasingly likely that reactive purchases by neighboring states will follow and result in even greater importation of sophisticated weapon systems.

Fear of neighbors armed with more modern systems is not unrealistic for African states, for a growing trend toward violence has become evident in Africa. Continued internal strife, particularly among ethnic groups, expansionist nationalism, foreign intervention, and cross-border military operations by neighboring states have characterized recent African history.

The ability of civilian decisionmakers (where they exist in Africa) to resist demands made by the military for new, expensive hardware is limited. Civilian leaders, as well as soldier-politicians themselves, are aware that the greatest threat to regime survival is most often their own armed forces. Diversion of scarce resources to assuage military demands is viewed as an expedient means of promoting personal and regime security.

These demand factors have been evenly matched by a willingness on the part of international suppliers to provide modern weapons to Africa. The trend for sophisticated weaponry has been reinforced by France, seeking markets; the United States, seeking local allies; smaller states such as Brazil

or Israel, seeking commercial and political clientele; and particularly the Soviet Union, seeking influence.[4]

For the Soviets, the transfer of conventional arms represents the most readily available instrument of foreign policy and one that permits the Soviet Union to compete on the most even terms with Western powers in Africa. The period with which this research is concerned saw a great leap in "Soviet diplomacy-through-arms." In 1975, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for less than five percent of total Soviet arms sales to the Third World. In 1978, the region's proportionate share had risen to almost half.[5] In a 1981 article, Richard E. Bissell echoed the belief of other African observers. He stated, "access to military organizations through arms sales has been decisive in creating diplomatic opportunity and in determining the short-term directions of client states."[6]

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[4]Walter L. Barrows, "Dynamics of Military Rule in Black Africa," in African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities eds. Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 90.

[5]U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978, ER 79-10412U. (Washington, D.C.: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979), p. 21.

[6]Richard E. Bissell, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1981), p. 12.

Statement of Research Question

The focus of this research was an analysis of Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1973-1983. The analysis had two specific objectives. The first was to describe the range of military assistance relationships that existed between the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan nations during that period. The second sought, through the analysis of one possible indicator, evidence of the ability of Soviet conventional arms transfers to achieve political influence as noted by Bissell and others.

The results of the analysis were used to answer the following research question: Did the Soviet Union gain political influence with recipient states, as indicated by the similarity of United Nations voting records, as a result of its arms transfers to sub-Saharan African nations?

Assumptions

A comparison of a Soviet arms recipient's United Nations voting record to the Soviet Union's cannot be viewed as an end-all assessment of political influence, for it is recognized that the provision of military assistance serves as only a single facet of complex foreign policy efforts. Nor can it be assumed that United Nation's voting records provide an all encompassing measure of political influence.

Evidence of the importance the Soviets place upon the United Nations in the execution of their foreign policy is presented in a book titled Soviet

Foreign Policy. The authors, Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, noted that the Soviet Union and other Communist party-states:

> . . . do not join or remain in international organizations because they have long-range goals with the noncommunist members. They join and remain in such organizations because they share some short-range interests with the other members and because they can turn their participation to their own advantage . . . they attempt to guide as many policies of the organization as possible in accordance with Soviet aims.[7]

Therefore, as the Soviet Union perceives that its participation in the United Nations serves as a means of exploiting existing North-South tensions to its own benefit, the voting records of recipients of Soviet military assistance served as a useful and justified indicator of Soviet political influence.

Limitations

Any evaluation of the effectiveness of arms transfers in determining a favorable political outcome must remain both highly subjective and uncertain. To a large degree, this follows from the uncertainty of the data available to a researcher. The bureaucratic secrecy surrounding the military activities of nations and the general inefficiency of arms transfer reporting

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[7] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1968), p. 352.

limit the strength of conclusions that can be drawn in this area. Research dealing with the Soviet Union and its arms transfer programs is particularly subject to these limitations.

Available Soviet arms transfer data represents approximations based on only partial or uncertain data from unclassified sources. Much of what is made known of Soviet arms activities becomes available only years after the event. Or, as in the case of Egypt, such information becomes generally available only if a recipient reorients its political focus from East to West.

To overcome this difficulty information concerning Soviet activities was sought from a variety of open-source publications. The information provided by three distinct arms transfer data sets of separate organizations was used primarily in the conduct of this research.

The first of these, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), annually publishes the World Armaments and Disarmaments SIPRI Yearbook. SIPRI statistics in this volume cover the delivery of four major conventional weapons categories: naval vessels, aircraft, armored fighting vehicles, and missile systems. All types of transfers are included in SIPRI computations including direct sales, aid, gifts, loans and grants. To provide a measure of the total volume of the arms trade, rather than an aggregate of the sums paid, SIPRI establishes a dollar value for each arms transaction as it becomes known. In determining the value of a specific transfer, SIPRI independently evaluates each transfer to include actual prices (as they become known), date of production, depreciation rate, weight, speed and role of the weapon. For weapons for which all price information is lacking a comparison is made with a known

weapon of the same performance criteria, and the weapon is valued accordingly.

Of extreme value for this research were the SIPRI arms registers found in each annual. These registers provide a record of all known deliveries and of known incomplete orders. Entries in each register are made alphabetically, by recipient, supplier and weapon. Information provided includes quantities, year of order, year of delivery and, often, comments on licensing arrangements, unit cost, or financing arrangements. SIPRI acknowledges that its coverage of Soviet arms exports is less reliable than its coverage of exports by Western countries due to the uncertainty and irregularity of Soviet data.

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) publishes the second data set used in this research. Published annually, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers provides constant and current dollar values for arms transfers during the current year and prior five-year periods. The ACDA regards arms transfers (the import or export of arms) as the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter, or cash) of military equipment and other commodities designed for military use. ACDA estimates provide dollar values for the transfer of major systems to include tactical aircraft, naval vessels, armored and nonarmored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery and other ordnance items. Also included by the ACDA are lesser expenditures for small arms, ammunition, uniforms, and miscellaneous services. Equipment with the potential for dual use in both military and civilian sectors is

included when its primary mission is identified as military.[8] Information on the procedure used to value Soviet arms transfers is not provided other than ACDA's mention of "approximations based on limited information." Further, unlike SIPRI, only limited information on the types and quantity of equipment transferred is available from ACDA' s publication.

A third organization, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), annually publishes an authoritative assessment of the armed forces of the world. Two sections of an IISS publication, The Military Balance, were useful in the completion of this project. First, it provides a quantitative view of the present inventory of major weapon systems in over a hundred countries. If one assumes there is no domestic production for sub-Saharan countries (with the exception of South Africa), increased inventories from one year to the next indicate an arms transfer delivery. Second, the IISS publication includes a section titled "Major Identified Arms Agreements." In this section at least partial information as to donor, recipient, dates, weapon descriptions and quantities, and approximate costs is provided for the previous year.

Delimitations

In recognition of the time lag associated with information concerning Soviet arms transfers, the ten-year period between 1974 and 1983 was

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[8]U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, Pubn. No. 123 (1985), p. 142.

selected as the focus of this research. This timeframe was further divided into two five-year periods, 1974-1978 and 1979-1983, to assist in the comparative analysis. Further, a limited number of countries were selected for review in accordance with criteria established in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction to the Research Approach

In conducting this research project the Structured, Focused Comparison Method described by Alexander George was utilized.[9] This research approach makes use of either a single case or the controlled comparison of a limited number of cases to further one's understanding of a narrow area of interest.

Although an integrated process, this method may be characterized by three distinct phases. Phase 1 results in the development of a design and structure for the conduct of the research study. The focal point of this phase is the development of a set of general questions which are addressed to each case of the controlled comparison. These questions serve to further define a researcher's data requirements. In Phase 2, individual case studies are accomplished in accordance with the design. Each case is reviewed to

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[9]Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," Diplomacy (n.d.): 43-68

identify the data requirements defined in Phase 1. The value of a dependent variable or outcome is sought in each case by exercising a standard procedure. Finally, in Phase 3, the results of individual case studies are assessed in light of the basic research question.

The Research Project Methodology

Phase 1: Project Design

At the outset of this research project, the design was developed through the execution of three distinct tasks, the definition of hypotheses, the identification of variables and appropriate typology, and the selection of appropriate cases for controlled comparison.

Task 1.

The basic research question was redefined as a principal and supporting hypotheses. Thereafter, the purpose of the research was to confirm or reject the following hypotheses:

1. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represents the sole or predominant supplier of military arms and equipment to a recipient country, that country will "mirror image" the Soviet Union's voting record on issues brought to a vote before the United Nations General Assembly.

2. The greater the quantity of military assistance provided by the Soviet Union, the more similar will be United Nations voting records of the supplier and recipient .

3. The greater the relative level of sophistication of weaponry transferred to a recipient by the Soviet Union, the more similar will be supplier and recipient voting records.

4. The more favorable the military assistance transfer terms to the recipient nation for the assistance provided by the Soviet Union, the more similar will be supplier and recipient voting records.

Task 2.

Identification of the elements (conditions and variables) to be used in the controlled comparison of individual case studies resulted in the development of the following general questions:

Independent Variables - Arms Transfers

1. What was the arms supply relationship that existed between the suppliers of military arms and the case study recipient during the period researched?

2. When were arms deliveries first initiated to the recipient nation by the Soviet Union?

3. What level (quantity) of military assistance was provided by the Soviet Union?

4. In relation to other sub-Saharan African recipients of Soviet military assistance what was the relative level of sophistication (quality) of the military arms provided by the U.S.S.R.?

5. Were the transfer terms associated with the receipt of military assistance from the Soviet Union favorable to the recipient?

Intercedent Variables

6. Was a significant event or set of circumstances present which justified the recipient seeking increased levels of military capability? (Examples would include threats to regime survival due to internal insurrection or external invasion.)

7. What manner of government orientation/ideology was defined by the recipient's governmental structure, rhetoric or existing treaties?

Dependent Variable - United Nations General Assembly Voting Outcomes

8. To what degree did the recipient's voting record in the General Assembly of the United Nations replicate that of the Soviet Union?

Typology - Concept Definition

The following provides the concept definitions required by the above questions:

Question 1. -- The arms transfer relationships existing between donor countries and individual case study recipients were categorized as either a sole supplier relationship, a predominant supplier relationship, or one of multiple suppliers (see tables 1 and 2). A sole supplier for the purpose of this study provided 100 percent of the recipient country's military equipment. A predominant supplier was noted as one which provided in excess of 60 percent of the recipient country's military equipment. In the case of no single supplier providing 60 percent of a case country's military equipment, a multiple supplier relationship existed. Multiple supplier relationships were further defined as solely from Western sources, Eastern sources or a cross-bloc relationship.[10]

To define this concept, statistical information provided by the ACDA in its annual report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, was used. Unless otherwise noted, this same source was used for all data reflecting dollar values of arms transfers presented in this study. Further, to permit additional comparison for analysis, coding for this question and those that follow reflected two distinct periods for coding, 1974-78 and 1979-83.

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[10]Basic typology derived from Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 7, 104-5, 111-5.

Question 2. -- The response to this question noted the earliest date identified in unclassified sources for the delivery of Soviet military equipment to a recipient country.

Question 3. -- Coding used to denote the quantity of arms transferred was accomplished by calculating the expected percentage mean allocation for each period (100 divided by the number of potential recipients).[11] For example, for the period 1974-1978 there were forty-three potential recipients and the mean percentage allocation was 2.33. Next, the cumulative dollar value of arms delivered to each recipient by the Soviet Union for the five-year period was expressed as a percentage of the total value of Soviet arms deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa during that period. Categorization for this factor was as follows:

No receipt of Soviet aid	NONE
Zero to half the mean value	SLIGHT
Greater than half to one-and-a-half the mean value	LOW
Greater than one-and-a-half to three times the mean value	MEDIUM
Greater than three times the	HIGH

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[11]Typology follows that of R. D. McKinlay and A. Mughan, Aid and Arms to the Third World: An Analysis of the Distribution and Impact of US Official Transfers, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), app. B, p. 271.

mean value

Question 4. -- Coding the quality of Soviet arms transferred reflected a subjective assessment by this author of the relative technical sophistication of Soviet military equipment provided to sub-Saharan African recipients.

T-34 Main Battle Tanks (MBT)	LOW
MiG-15 (Fagot)/-17 (Fresco) Fighter-Ground Attack Aircraft.	
SA-7 (Grail) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)	
T-54/-55 MBTs	MODERATE
MiG-19 (Farmer)/-21 (Fishbed) Multi-role Fighter Aircraft	
SA-2 (Guideline)/-3 (Goa) SAMs	
MI-8 (Hip) Utility Helicopters	
T-62/-64/-72 MBTs	HIGH
MiG-23 (Flogger)/-25 (Foxbat) Fighter Aircraft	
SA-5 (Gammon) SA-6 (Gainful) SA-8 (Gecko) SAMs	
MI-24 (Hind) Combat Assault Helicopters	

Question 5. -- Transfer Terms were considered to be favorable to the recipient state if military assistance was provided by grant or repayable in exchange/commodities trade. For the Soviet Union to require payment in hard currency, especially over a short-term period, was considered unfavorable to the recipient.

Question 6. -- In addition to an assessment of the previous concerns an identification of actual or perceived threat (internal or external) to recipient regime survival was made. Such threats would justify a recipient seeking increased levels of military capability. The Strategic Survey published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, served as an independent source of information on security developments within the case nations throughout the periods of research interest.

Question 7. -- The recipient nation's attitude toward the Soviet Union's military role on the African continent was noted using the typology developed by the noted Africanist Colin Legum. [2]

1. Pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninists: display friendship for the Communist World, react favorably to Soviet intervention and with hostility to Western nations' intervention.

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[12]Colin Legum, "The USSR and Africa: The African Environment," Problems of Communism, (January-February 1978): 11-12.

2. Pro-Peking Marxist-Leninists: suspect all forms of Soviet aid, active among the intelligentsia and national liberation movements.

3. Marxist or Radical Leanings: welcome Soviet aid with reservations.

4. Anti-Communist but Accept Soviet Aid: overtly anti-Communist but find it convenient to accept military assistance from the Soviet Union; inclined to make public their differences with Moscow.

5. Non-Aligned - Accept Soviet Assistance: pragmatic decisions about Soviet policies; inclined to make public their objections.

6. Non-Aligned - No Soviet Aid: do not seek Soviet Assistance.

7. Anti-Soviet: view Soviet aims with greater suspicion than Western or Chinese aims.

Question 8. -- To determine the dependent variable a comparison was made of the recipient's voting record to the recorded vote of the USSR on selected United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Abstention by, or the absence of, the recipient during a vote was considered as not supporting the Soviet Union's position.

Task 3

Appropriate cases were selected for comparison in respect to the data requirements of the study identified in task 2 as described in the following sections.

Identification of Individual Case Nations

Ten states which would serve as case studies were selected by a two step process. First, all sub-Saharan nations were coded to identify their arms acquisition pattern during each of the five-year periods under review. Next, insuring a distribution among all possible acquisition patterns, the ten states which represented the greatest geostrategic and political interest to both East and West were selected. These ten countries ranged the spectrum of possible arms transfer patterns with the Soviet Union. The nations include one where the Soviets were the sole supplier of military assistance (Guinea); three represented a predominant supplier relationship (Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique); and three that maintained cross-bloc ties with both Eastern and Western bloc suppliers (Nigeria, Zambia and Zaire). Three countries who had received no military aid from the Soviets during either period were included as a controlled means of comparison (Ghana, Kenya and the Ivory Coast). In three cases (Guinea, Ghana and Zambia), the arms supply relationship changed between the two periods, providing an additional element of comparison.

Identification of United Nations General Assembly Votes

Ten votes each from the thirty-third and thirty-eighth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly (1978 and 1983) were used to evaluate recipient voting practices. The selected group of multilateral issues represented a regional and issue distribution appropriate for the purpose of this research.

Those votes selected from the thirty-third United Nations General Assembly were identified in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa by Gerald B. Helman, Deputy Secretary of State for International Organizations, as of particular importance to the United States.[13] These resolutions from 1978 consisted of a single vote on Latin America (human rights in Chile); four on the Middle East (nuclear and military collaboration with Israel [2 votes], assistance to the Palestinian people, condemnation of Israeli occupation of Arab territories); two concerning the New World Order (transfer of resources to the developing countries, New World Information and Communications Order); one on energy concerns (convening an international energy conference); one on the southern Africa situation (condemnation of Israeli and United States "collaboration" with South Africa); and a final vote for United Nations' budget appropriations.

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[13]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interests in Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 104.

The ten votes described by the United States Mission to the United Nations as the most important of the thirty-eighth session were utilized for the later period of review.[14] From 1983, these resolutions included two votes on the Middle East (Israel's credentials and a resolution on U.S. support for Israel); two on Latin America (both concerning Grenada); two on Africa (apartheid and the U.S.- Republic of South Africa relationship); two on Asia (Kampuchea and Afganistan); one on arms control (chemical and bacteriological weapons); and one on human rights (El Salvador).

Phase 2: Conducting the Case Studies

In undertaking the case studies, each of the cases were examined as to the data requirements established by the general questions developed in task 2.

Phase 3: Evaluating the Case Studies

This phase considered the manner in which the range of outcomes could best be described in support of or in rejection of the hypothesis.

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[14]U.S., Department of State, Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations: Submitted Pursuant to Public Law 98-151 and Public Law 98-164, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984). t. 9.

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING PRACTICES

In the course of a single General Assembly session the 158 member states act on many diverse and far ranging issues. Hence, the voting record of any specific United Nations member state tends to explain a great deal about that nation's foreign policy orientation and, by comparison, the degree of support by that government for the foreign policies of the major international actors.

In testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations in February 1984, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, identified four reasons as to why United Nations votes have taken on a greater importance in the international arena.[15]

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[15]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1984, pp. 8-11.

1. United Nations voting determines the policy of United Nations bodies -- As semi-legislative assemblies, both the General Assembly and the Security Council consist of national representatives who determine agendas, debate regional and international issues and either by consensus or by roll call vote, deal with the same. By voting, the General Assembly directs the actions of the United Nations' Secretary General and the Secretariat, allocates funding and provides direction to the global operations of the United Nations' subordinate organizations.

2. United Nations votes focus world attention -- The agenda, those issues brought before the General Assembly, influences the definition and perceptions of the world community toward international conflicts. Those problems debated in this forum become the focus of the world media's attention. This explains the efforts of the major blocs to define the United Nations' agenda and, therefore, define world opinion. Manipulation of the United Nations' agenda has been proven to be an effective foreign policy tool.[16]

3. Votes define "world opinion" on major issues -- Decisions of the United Nations General Assembly are often interpreted as reflecting world opinion, legitimizing national actions and denoting the "good guys and the bad guys." Ambassador Kirkpatrick utilized the example of damage done to

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[16]For example, the continued emphasis on the plight of Palestinian refugees has kept the issue in the forefront of the world's attention, at the sacrifice of granting equal concern for the needs of more numerous refugee populations.

the Republic of South Africa, subject to continuous denunciation and longstanding exclusion from the United Nations' organizations, in her testimony before Congress. A determined opposition to minority rule in South Africa has secured passage of resolutions that make demands, knowing that they will not be followed by the government in Pretoria. Such resolutions label South Africa as an "international outlaw" and a target for further sanctions. The recent United Nations resolution which equated zionism to racism serves as another prime example.

By preventing an issue from reaching the floor of the General Assembly a state may prevent itself from becoming the target of United Nations' criticism and correspondingly diminish criticism in the international community. An example of this was the appointment of special human rights observers for Israel while refusing to hold the Marxist regime in Ethiopia to the same oversight. United Nations debate and votes therefore effect the international image of a nation-state and create the perception of political power in the international system.

Kirkpatrick further noted that of greater importance than image in international politics, United Nations votes assist in defining "the limits of the permissible."

> If after shooting down the Korean airliner, the Soviet Union had not been forced for the first time since the invasion of Afganistan to veto a resolution[17] then the impression of worldwide revulsion against attacking a civilian airliner would have been weaker.

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[17]If nine of the fifteen members of the Security Council do not vote for a resolution, it fails and no veto is required to prevent its passage.

4. United Nations votes affect United States foreign policy -- The consequences of United Nations activity in the context of United States foreign policy has been shown by the impact of Nicaragua's initiative (supported by the Soviet bloc) to move the crisis of Central America from the regional level into the United Nations. This in turn has both influenced the Contadora process and United States policy.

A nations voting practices in the United Nations may not necessarily reflect a rational consideration of the pros and cons, the facts or moral values of a specific issue. Rather, over time a country's voting record will depict what a government believes to be in its best interests (in the context of the United Nations) and its choice among values and priorities. Several factors among the range of determinants that influence how a nation might vote on a specific resolution include:

1. A country's form of government, ideology, and basic political values.

2. A country's geographical location.

3. A country's level of achievement toward economic development.

4. The country's existing bilateral relations.

5. The state's membership in regional and international bodies, including those internal to the United Nations organization - the most important of these being the Non-Aligned Movement which includes one hundred of the 158 nations which hold membership in the United Nations.

6. The nation's perception as to the balance of political power internal to the United Nations and within the international system.

7. Estimates of the impact of United Nations actions on vital bilateral relations outside of the United Nations forum, especially economic, military and cultural relations may strongly influence voting within the General Assembly.

8. The facts and values associated with a particular issue in light of the nation's domestic politics.

The participation of the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations has been characterized as serving limited Soviet purposes and expectations. Its membership in this international organization is based upon opportunity and only limited mutuality of interests with other member-states. Soviet interests that may be served by its activities in the United Nations include:

1. Settlement of minor international conflicts.

2. Establishing international contacts which permit formal and informal negotiation to take place.

3. Gathering of political, economic, and technical intelligence.

4. Gaining prestige and respectability as a major world power.

5. Engaging in propaganda in an attempt to influence the views, attitudes, political alignments and actions of the member-states.

To a large measure, the U.S.S.R. perceives that its participation serves as a means to exploit existing North-South tensions for its own benefit.[18] With such a perception, it becomes particularly appropriate that voting outcomes within the United Nations be used as an indicator of political influence.

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[18]Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry Into Soviet Motives and Objectives. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 192.

CHAPTER 4

REVIEW OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Since the 1950s, the African continent has been a stage for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Until recent years, that foreign policy was characterized by increased Soviet activism and the deeper involvement of the Soviet Union in African regional affairs.

More concerned with those countries in close proximity to its own borders, a coherent Soviet policy toward Africa (with the exception of support for national liberation movements) was not apparent prior to the early 1960s. It was during this period that many of the African states won recognition as independent sovereign nations.

At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Nikita Krushchev stated "the present disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world-historical importance."[19]

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[19]David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy," Problems of Communism, XXVII (January-February 1978): 21.

With the hastened departure of the European powers from Africa in the wake of World War II the leadership of the Soviet Union perceived an opportunity to assume a position of influence in Africa once held by the colonial powers.

Making a Soviet African policy possible was a recognition of differing, non-Soviet models of socialist development and the right of African nations to forge their own path to socialism. Armed with doctrinal justification, Moscow attempted to extend its influence to Africa by establishing diplomatic and economic ties with a number of the revolutionary democrats and self-proclaimed "African socialists". Such leaders as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Guinea and Patrice Lumumba in the former Belgian Congo (Zaire) found themselves courted by Moscow's emissaries. Between 1957 and 1965, millions of roubles in economic credits and grants were extended to the emerging nations of Africa. Providing substantial military assistance to countries perceived by the Soviets as anti-imperialist proved as important as the courting of "progressive" African nations.

Early Soviet optimism of their ability to modify the existing international balance of power (through Soviet involvement in the Third World) and further the advancement of a world socialist order was short-lived. The seizure of power by dissident military officers (which became a recurring event throughout Africa in the mid 1960s) forced a reappraisal of African policies by the Soviets. After ten years of substantial economic and military aid, few African countries, even among those who relied heavily upon Soviet support, were willing to accept indigenous communist parties as a legitimate political element. In many African states the local communist

party organization was subject to imposed bans on their political activities and persecution of individual members. The overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana and subsequently, other "progressive" leaders throughout Africa, the Soviet failure to maintain the central authority of Lumumba in the Congo and the loss of a substantial Soviet investment in Eqypt in 1972 convinced those in Moscow of the error of previous strategies.

Soviet realization of the failure to ensure long-term gains led to the emergence of a new more aggressive foreign policy in Africa. This new strategy was formed as a response to a number of perceived shifts in the military and political international balance:

1. The achievement of strategic parity with the United States.

2. A growing Soviet capability for global power projection.

3. Following the Vietnam conflict, Soviet perception of an American unwillingness to challenge Russian actions in areas not considered vital to U.S. interests.

4. During the 1973 energy crisis, a demonstration of vulnerability by the Western Bloc to resource denial tactics.[20]

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[20]Alexander R. Alexiev, The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World, (Sana Monica: The Rand Corporation, [1983]), pp. 12-3.

The new Soviet program to gain leverage and control on the African continent following that reappraisal was pursued simultaneously through political, economic and military means. Moscow's objective in the political realm was the restructuring of client-state political institutions to model the Soviet Marxist-Leninist example. This form of totalitarian government was viewed as serving a dual purpose. First, control of a nation's population by the client regime reduced the likelihood of internal opposition. Second, the party infrastructure permitted the Soviets to maneuver the client country's political direction. Although an incomplete process, the development of vanguard Marxist parties in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and other African countries has fostered conditions which facilitate long-term ties to the Soviet Union.

With few exceptions, Soviet economic assistance during this period equated to credits that were tied to the delivery of goods from the client state. Most often, this arrangement provides economic benefit to the Soviet Union at the expense of the client's own economic development. For some states, the granting of access to facilities for military purposes has served as partial repayment to the Soviets.

A failure to provide multilateral economic aid in amounts that would lead to self-sufficiency has persistently challenged the long-term prospects for the gaining of influence in Africa by the Soviets. Disruption of the economic sector associated with the introduction of a state controlled economic system added to the vulnerability of the Kremlin strategy.

The increased assertiveness of the revamped Soviet strategy was best characterized by a willingness to either engage in or directly sponsor

military actions to insure its objectives. Access to military organizations through arms sales was decisive in creating diplomatic opportunity and in determining the short-term direction of client states.[21] Military involvement, arms transfers and the provision of military advisors (which have represented the predominant instruments of Soviet foreign policy in Africa) were intended to foster a dependent relationship between African regimes and Moscow for both internal and external security requirements. This dependence was expected to ensure a long-term Soviet presence in the recipient countries. The interjection of Soviet military forces and equipment on a massive scale sustained radical movements in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia beginning in 1977. In both instances, those sponsored by the Soviets would likely have fallen from power without such intervention.[22] The continued requirement of these regimes for an international patron to fill their security needs has ensured, in Soviet eyes, a close and lasting relationship.

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[21]Richard E. Bissell, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1981), p. 12.

[22]John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 2 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978) and Neil McFarlane, Soviet Intervention in Third World Conflicts (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1983), pp. 12-17.

Four main objectives appeared to underscore Soviet actions in Africa during this period:

1. To reduce, if not eliminate, Western influence in Africa. Disruption of the political, military and economic systems left in place by the departing colonial powers was pursued as an element of the greater East-West conflict.

2. To further reduce the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Africa. The PRC's presence in sub-Sahara Africa has been considerably reduced following the civil war in Angola. Yet, fearful of a renewed Chinese attempt to forge a new role for itself in the region, the Kremlin viewed China as a principal threat to the USSR's efforts.[23]

3. To expand existing Soviet capabilities to project military power on a global basis. The development of a "blue water" navy and a true strategic airlift capability served to enhance the Soviet position in Africa and throughout the Third World. Strategic access, naval staging ports, storage and repair facilities and overflight privileges in proximity to crucial sea lanes and geographical chokepoints contribute immeasurably to Soviet military potentials.

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[23]David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 37.

4. To establish a lasting Soviet presence and gain a commanding voice in the internal and international affairs of African states.

Since the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet foreign policy toward Africa and the Third World in general has once again assumed a new direction. Statements made by Gorbachev and recent actions of the Soviets show that foreign policy concerns have been superseded by domestic imperatives. To permit Gorbachev to carry out ambitious economic and political reform within the Soviet Union, international diversions of Soviet resources require reduction. As they did in Afghanistan, the Soviets have sought to reduce a foreign policy environment of conflict in Angola and Ethiopia. Yet, at least one recent study maintains that the Soviet Union will not willingly forego its military and political interests in Africa and the Third World. Rather, it is believed that the Soviet Union will continue to "seek influence and worry about prestige and commitments, but more in a manner of a traditional great power than as the bearer and home of a universal ideology."[24] If true, it is unlikely that Soviet actions in Africa will be limited to only those countries which have formed vanguard parties based upon Marxism-Leninism. Only time will reveal the new direction the Soviets will follow in their dealings with sub-Saharan Africa.

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[24]Francis Fukuyama, The Tenth Period of Soviet Third World Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1987), p. 29.

Throughout the history of the Soviets involvement in African affairs, a primary instrument for the achievement of Soviet objectives has been the transfer of military equipment and arms. The effectiveness of this transfer of military capability to African states in an attempt to gain political influence (as measured by UN voting practices) is evaluated in the following sections.

CHAPTER 5

REVIEW OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The most vigorous efforts of the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan Africa have been those directed at the establishment of military ties and a Soviet physical presence within the region.[25] In the establishment of military relations with African nations, the provision of military arms and supplies, senior-level military exchanges, training provided to foreign military personnel in the Soviet Union and the assignment of Soviet technical and instructor personnel to recipient countries have all served important roles.

For the purpose of description, a review of Soviet military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa can be defined by four distinct periods. Guinea initiated the first period of Soviet military assistance. In 1958, Moscow responded to a request from Guinean President Sékou Touré by providing

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[25]Morris Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power, (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1981), p. 73.

anti-aircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers, and basic infantry small arms to the Guinean Army. During the first period, 1958-1964, virtually any African nation which requested Soviet arms received some manner of military assistance. The Soviet Union made use of limited military assistance, in combination with other instruments of foreign policy, in their attempt to gain an initial foothold within the region. Early Soviet efforts to establish contacts were aided by the political ambitions of emerging dynamic national leaders such as Touré of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, regional conflicts, and the delayed pace of decolonization.[26] The largest single arms agreement of the period was that signed in 1963 with Somalia and valued at $35 million.

Several of those to whom the Soviet Union granted military assistance during this period proved to lack either wide domestic support or international acceptance. Because of this, the Soviets experienced a number of setbacks. The most notable and frustrating setback for the Soviet leadership was, as a result of the maneuvers of United Nations authorities, the inability to provide promised support to President Patrice Lumumba of the former Belgium Congo .

The second period, 1965-1971, has been characterized as one in which overall Soviet criteriia for the granting of military assistance were more demanding than they had been in the first period. The Soviet Union concentrated its assistance on a few African nations which were of strategic

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[26]Joachim Krause, "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa," in The Soviet Impact in Africa, eds. R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi (Lexington, MA and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 126.

interest to them. Other African states which shared a commitment to the socialist model of economic development were recognized with only minor Soviet aid. Quantitatively, Soviet arms transfers grew at a slow rate during this period.

Somalia, occupying a strategic position on the Horn of Africa, remained a central focus of Soviet attention. It and the many national liberation movements active in Africa were the principal recipients of Soviet military assistance. Providing large quantities of arms to liberation groups served as a Soviet bid to ensure influence with the new governments of Africa as they came to power.[27] During this period, Nigeria, which retained close ties to Western bloc nations, was the second largest recipient of Soviet arms as a result of the Nigerian/Biafran civil war.

Beginning in 1972, the third period was marked by an increased willingness, on the part of the Soviets, for risk-taking in Africa. Western observers noted a vast increase in the quantity of Soviet arms delivered to African clients and of Soviet involvement in the affairs of African states during the period 1972-1978. Several reasons for this change in Soviet method have been offered by analysts.[28] First, for the first time, the Soviets had sufficient material and transport capability to support far-flung African regimes. Second, the Soviet leadership had a heightened interest in obtaining overseas facilities in support of Soviet naval and air operations.

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[27]Walter F. Hahn, Walter and Alvin J. Cottrell, Soviet Shadow Over Africa. (Coral Gables, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1977), p. 56.

[28]Ibid., p. 128.

Third, the United States' foreign policy remained locked in a period of hesitancy following the Vietnam experience. Last, the opportunity presented itself within the region to permit the Soviet Union to exercise its new capabilities.

In 1972, the Soviets committed themselves to a major modernization of the armed forces of Somalia. Two years later, the Soviet Union was rewarded for its efforts with the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Somalia and the granting of access to the Somali port facilities at Berbera. In 1977, events on the Horn lead to a reversal of roles and alliances between the United States and Ethiopia and the Soviet Union and Somalia. The Soviet airlift of arms to Ethiopia during 1977-1978 remains, to the present day, the single largest transfer of military capability to a sub-Saharan country.

In southern Africa, the Soviets had been wary of deepening their involvement in the internal conflict of Angola. Yet, following the intervention of the Republic of South Africa in Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union transferred sufficient weaponry to the MPLA to insure that it and its Cuban allies held air and ground superiority.

Throughout the period, the Soviet Union maintained or strengthened previously established military relations (Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) and cemented new ties with Mozambique, Madagascar, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Equitorial Guinea.

As a result of the levels of support given the Marxist governments of Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for almost one-half of the total transfer of Soviet arms to the Third World in 1978.[29]

In the fourth period (since 1978), the Soviet Union has given priority to its ties with the Marxist regimes of Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. Each remains dependent upon the Soviet Union for military aid in the face of continued vulnerability to domestic insurgent groups. Additionally, arms relationships continue with many other African states. The ideological orientations of these nations, which include Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia, remain wide and varied.

Prior to the 1970s, the total dollar value and numbers of equipment delivered to sub-Saharan clients were relatively small. By 1976, the Soviet Union delivered to Africa more weapons in virtually every category than the United States or the former colonial powers.[30] For example, the U.S.S.R. delivered 1,355 tanks to Africa during the period 1979-1983 compared to only 20 by the United States; 2,050 field artillery pieces to 40 from the United Kingdom; 18 major naval surface combatants to 5 by France; and 545

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[29]U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978. ER 79-10412U. (Washington, D.C.: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979), p. 21.

[30]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980-85: An Imperial Burden or Political Asset?, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985,by the Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 222.

supersonic combat aircraft of an African total of 734.[31] Table 1 shows the manner in which the Soviet Union has become an important actor in African affairs as a result of a massive increase in arms deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa.

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[31]U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985. Publication 123. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1985), pp. 135.

TABLE 1

VALUE OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, CUMULATIVE 1974-1978, 1979-1983.

(Million Final Year Dollars)

Country	1974-1978	1979-1983
Angola	410	1,500
Benin	20	120
Botswana	..	10
Burundi	5	20
Cape Verde	20	40
Chad	10	..
Congo	30	120
Equatorial Guinea	10	10
Ethiopia	1,300	1,800
Guinea	50	20
Guinea-Bissau	10	20
Madagascar	20	110
Mali	100	40
Mozambique	130	525
Nigeria	80	100
Sao Tome & Principe	..	5
Sierra Leone	..	5
Somalia	300	..
Sudan	30	..
Tanzania	110	270
Uganda	110	10
Zambia	40	180
Zimbabwe	..	5
Total	2,785	4,910

SOURCES: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, Publication 123, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 161-2 and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, Publication 123, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 131-2.

As African militaries have sought to modernize their forces in qualitative terms as well as quantitative, the general nature of Soviet weaponry transferred has changed. Early African security needs could commonly be met with the delivery of obsolete, but still effective, weapons. Large quantities of these weapons were available to the Soviets as a result of their own military modernization programs.

Also in earlier periods, there appeared to be a Soviet policy that maintained a generation gap between those arms provided to Middle Eastern clients and those finding their way to sub-Saharan Africa. For example, if Syria were to receive MiG-23 aircraft, transfers to Africa would be no more sophisticated than MiG-21 fighters. More recent transfers have shown less hesitation on the part of the Soviets to provide an increasing proportion of late-model equipment to African clients. Since the late 1970s, Soviet shipments of supersonic fighter aircraft, SAMs, ATGMs and armored fighting vehicles have included many of the same weapons found in Soviet frontline organizations. The Soviet first-line T-72 has replaced older T-54/-55 and T-62 tanks. In Nigeria, Angola, and Ethiopia, it is apparent that inventories of fighter aircraft have been subject to periodic replacement and update (MiG-15/-17s exchanged for MiG-21s and later by MiG-23s or later generation aircraft).[32]

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[32]"Angola: MIG-23," Africa Confidential, 18 February 1987, p. 8.

Complex military equipment requires skilled personnel to assemble, maintain, and operate it. As a result, extensive training of African military personnel in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations has complemented the transfer of arms. During 1978-1979, 2,240 military personnel from sub-Saharan African nations underwent military training in Soviet military institutions. This number compares with a total of only 8,600 for the earlier period, 1959-1977.[33]

The transfer of arms has also necessitated the assignment of Soviet personnel in the recipient countries. Soviet military technicians and advisors perform three essential functions. They assist in the delivery, assembly, and maintenance of military equipment; the training of personnel to operate the equipment; and, the instructing of operational staffs in employment considerations.[34] Soviet military advisors in Angola and Ethiopia have assumed even greater roles of importance. The Soviets are assumed by Western intelligence analysts to have directed the Ethiopian counteroffensive following the Somali invasion of 1977. There are also reports that Soviet officers have been wounded, captured, or killed while advising combat activities in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.[35] Table 2 shows the level of the Soviet's military presence in the years 1978 and 1981.

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[33]Calculated by David E. Albright in his study, "The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s."

[34]Roger F. Pajak, " The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy in the Third World," in The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, ed. Robert H. Donaldson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 390.

[35]"Ethiopia: A Battle Lost, A War in Stalemate." Africa Confidential, 29 April 1988, p. 3.

TABLE 2

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1978 & 1981.

	1978	1981
Angola	1,300	1,600
Equatorial Guinea	150	--
Ethiopia	1,400	1,900
Guinea	100	50
Guinea-Bissau	65	50
Mali	180	205
Mozambique	230	550
Other	500	945
Sub-Saharan Total	3,815	5,300

SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978, ER 79-10412U. Washington, D.C.: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979 and Department of State. Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.

Another significant change that has taken place within the Soviet program, has been the increased commercialization of arms transfers.[36] Prior to the early 1970s, the majority of military equipment provided to African countries was provided through lenient credit terms. It was typical that credit rates were as low as 2.5 percent with a pay-back period of ten to twelve years following a grace period of one to three years. Favored clients

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[36]Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Military Assistance to the Third World," in Communist Nations Military Assistance, eds. John F. Cooper and Daniel S. Popp (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 47.

who lacked convertible currencies were permitted to make repayments in local currency or commodity exchange.[37] Additionally, Soviet equipment was sold at subsidized prices. Some estimates placed early discounts as much as forty percent (written off as grant aid). Even without discounting, it is generally recognized that Soviet arms have been cheaper than their Western counterparts. As their program of military transfers to sub-Saharan Africa has matured, the Soviets have been less able to rely upon older generations of military equipment to meet the demands of African states. As a result, beginning in the 1970s, the Soviet demand for hard currency as repayment rose. By 1978, such sales accounted for forty percent of all Soviet exports. The prices paid for Soviet arms have also become more aligned with Western equivalents, undermining the previous Soviet price advantage.[38] As the demand from African nations for more sophisticated weapons continues, discount pricing by the Soviets is expected to be even more limited.

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[37]Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 161.

[38]William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen, Arms and the Africans: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 56.

CHAPTER 6

TABULATED DATA

TABLE 3

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN ARMS ACQUISITION PATTERNS 1974-1978

(Countries denoted in **bold** print have been selected as case studies.)

Sole supplier (100%)

West		East	
Botswana (UK)	Upper Volta (FR)	Cape Verde (USSR)	**Guinea** (USSR)
		Equatorial Guinea (USSR)	Guinea-Bissau (USSR)
		Gambia (PRC)	

Predominant supplier (>60%)

West		East	
Ivory Coast (FR)	South Africa (FR)	**Angola** (USSR)*	Mali (USSR)
		Benin (USSR)*	**Mozambique** (USSR)
		Chad (USSR)*	Somalia (USSR)*
		Congo (USSR)	Tanzania (USSR)*
		Ethiopia (USSR)*	Uganda (USSR)
		Madagascar (USSR)	

Multiple suppliers (<60%)

West		East	Cross-bloc	
Gabon	Niger		Burundi	Sudan
Ghana	Rwanda		Cameron	**Zaire**
Kenya	Senegal		**Nigeria****	**Zambia**
Malawi	Togo			
Mauritania	Zimbabwe			

SOURCE: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, Publication 108 , (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 161-2.

Note: These nations had either no or negligible arms transfers: Central African Empire, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, and Swaziland.

*Despite their predominat arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union, these states maintained cross-bloc ties with Western suppliers.

**The Soviet Union represented the major supplier of arms to these countries.

TABLE 4

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN ARMS ACQUISITION PATTERNS 1979-1983

(Countries denoted in **bold** print have been selected as case studies.)

Sole supplier (100%)

West	East	
	Cape Verde (USSR)	Sao Tome and Principe (USSR)
	Guinea-Bissau (USSR)	

Predominant supplier (>60%)

West		East	
Chad (FR)	Senegal (FR)	**Angola** (USSR)*	Mali (USSR)*
Ghana (GE)	Somalia (IT)	Benin (USSR)*	Madagascar (USSR)*
Ivory Coast (FR)	Togo (FR)	Congo (USSR)	**Mozambique** (USSR)
Liberia (US)	Zimbabwe (UK)	**Ethiopia** (USSR)*	Tanzania (USSR)*
Niger (FR)		**Guinea** (USSR)*	**Zambia** (USSR)

Multiple suppliers (<60%)

West		East	Cross-bloc	
Burkina Faso	Mauritania		Botswana**	**Nigeria**
Cameron	Niger		Burundi**	Rwanda
Kenya	South		C.A.R.	Sierra Leone**
Lesotho	Africa		Equatorial	Sudan
Malawi			Guinea	Uganda
			Gabon	**Zaire**

SOURCE: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, Publication 123 , (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 131-2.

Note: These nations had either no or negligible arms transfers: Gambia, Mauritius, and, Swaziland.

*Despite their predominat arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union, these states maintained cross-bloc ties with Western suppliers.

**The Soviet Union represented the major supplier of arms to these countries.

TABLE 5

SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1974-1978

(Dollar Value in Millions)

High		
Angola (410)		Somalia (300)
Ethiopia (1,300)		
Medium		
Mali (100)		Tanzania (180)
Mozambique (130)		Uganda (110)
Low		
Guinea (50)		**Zambia** (40)
Nigeria (120)		
Slight		
Benin (20)	Chad (10)	Guinea-Bissau (10)
Burundi (5)	Congo (30)	Madagascar (20)
Cape Verde (20)	Equatorial Guinea (10)	Sudan (30)

SOURCE: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, Publication 123, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 161-2

TABLE 6

SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1979-1983

(Dollar Value in Millions)

High		
Angola (1,500)		**Mozambique** (525)
Ethiopia (1,800)		
Medium		
Tanzania (270)		**Zambia** (180)
Low		
Benin (120)		Madagascar (110)
Congo (120)		**Nigeria** (100)
Slight		
Botswana (10)	**Guinea** (20)	Sierra Leone (5)
Burundi (20)	Guinea-Bissau (20)	Uganda (10)
Cape Verde (40)	Mali (40)	Zimbabwe (5)
Equatorial Guinea (20)	Sao Tome & Principe (5)	

SOURCE: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, Publication 123 , (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 131-2.

TABLE 7

MILITARY ARMS/EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO CASE NATIONS 1974-1983

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Angola	France	37	SA-360 Dauphin	Helicopter	1983-84
	Netherlands	2	F-27 Maritime	Patrol aircraft	1980
	Portugal	2	SA-361B	Helicopter	1983
	Romania	16	BN-2A Islander	STOL aircraft	1978
		6	SA-316B	Helicopter	1983
	Switzerland	>2	Pilatus Turbo Porter	Transport aircraft	1976
		25	PC-7	Trainer aircraft	1983
	USA	3	Lockheed C-130, L-100-20	Transport aircraft	1980
		3	Cessna T-41	Trainer aircraft	1983
	USSR	100	BM-21, 122mm RL	Rocket launcher	1975
		160	BTR-50/-60/-152	AFVs	1975
		20	MiG-15/17	Fighter aircraft	1976
		..	122mm D-30	Artillery	1976
		6000	SA-7 Grail	SAM	1976-78
		4	An-26 Curl	Transport aircraft	1977
		2000	AT-3 Sagger	ATGM	1977-78
		40	BMP	AFV	1977
		..	SA-2 Guideline	SAM	..
		5	Mi-8 Hip	Utility Helicopter	1977
		48	MiG-21 Fishbed	Fighter aircraft	1977-78
		..	MiG-23 Flogger	Fighter aircraft	1977
		500	SA-3 Goa	SAM	1977
		85	T-34	MBT	1977
		250	T-54/-55	MBT	1977-78
		4	Shershen class	Patrol boat	1979
		..	SA-6 Gainful	SAM	1981
		30	AT-4 Spigot	ATGM	1982
		105	T-62	MBT	1981-83
		..	T-72	MBT	..
		5	An-12 Cub	Transport aircraft	1983
		21	Mi-8 Hip	Utility helicopter	1983
		10	MiG-21bis	Fighter aircraft	1983
		24	SA-8 Gecko	SAM	1983
		72	SA-9 Gaskin	SAM	1983
	Yugoslavia	50	M-47	MBT	1977

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Ethiopia	Canada	4	DHC-3 Twin Otter	Transport aircraft	1975
	France	..	Aérospatiale SS 12M	SSM	1976
	FRG	2	Dornier Do-28D-2	Transport aircraft	1979
	Iran	72	M60	MBT	1974
		..	M113	APC	1974
		1-2 Sqds	F5 Freedom Fighter	Fighter aircraft	1975
	USA	12	Cessna A-37 Dragonfly	Light attack aircraft	..
		15	Cessna 310	Transport aircraft	..
		16	Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II	Fighter aircraft	1976
		..	Hughes BGM-71 TOW	ATGM	..
		..	Raytheon AIM-9J Sidewinder	AAM	1976
		24	M60A1	MBT	..
		..	M113A1	APC	1977
	USSR	100	T-34	MBT	1977
		30	Mi-8 Hip	Helicopter	1977
		150	D-30, 122mm/D-201, 152mm	Artillery	..
		500	T-54/55	MBT	1977-80
		250	BTR-40/-60/-152	APC	..
		2000	AT-3 Sagger	ATGM	1977-78
		..	SA-2 Guideline	SAM	..
		500	SA-3 Goa	SAM	1977-78
		3000	SA-7 Grail	SAM	1977-78
		..	BRDM-2/BMP-1	AFV	..
		..	ZSU-23-4/-57-2	SP AA gun	..
		10	Mi-6 Hook	Helicopter	1978
		25-30	Mi-8 Hip	Utility helicopter	..
		2	Ossa II-Class	FAC	..
		2	Mol-Class	FAC	..
		46	MiG-17	Fighter aircraft	1978
		50	MiG-21	Fighter aircrat	..
		50	T-62	MBT	1980
		>20	Mi-24 Hind C	Attack helicopter	1980
		2	Polnocny class	Tank landing ship	1981-83
		8	An-12 A Cub	Transport aircraft	1982
		4	An-26 Curl	Transport aircraft	..
		1	Poluchat class	Patrol boat	1982
		20	MiG-23	Fighter aircraft	..
		6	MiG-25	Fighter aircraft	1983
		..	T-72	MBT	..

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Ghana	France	4	Aérospatiale Alguette III	Helicopter	1974
		24	MM-38 Exocet	SSM	1979
	FRG	4	Lürssen Werft 45 & 58m	Patrol boat	1979-80
	Italy	9	Aermacchi MB 326K	Attack aircraft	1978-80
		8	SF-260TP	Trainer aircraft	1983
Guinea	Egypt	50	Walid	APC	1983-84
	PRC	2	Shanghai-III class	Fast gunboat	1977
	USSR	30	T-34/-54	MBT	1970-80
		20	PT-76	AFV	1970-80
		40	BTR-40/-152	AFV	1970-80
		8	MiG-17	Fighter aircarft	1970-80
		4	IL-4	Cargo aircraft	1970-80
		1	Sadji Kaba	Patrol boat	1979
	Netherland	7	Fokker VFW F.27/28	Patrol aircraft	1974-75
	UK	6	Short Skyvan	Transport aircraft	1974
		7	SA-3-120 Bulldog	Trainer aircraft	1976
Ivory Coast	Canada	..	DHC-5D Buffalo	Transport aircraft	1978
	France	3	Aérospatiale SA-330 Puma	Utility Helicopter	1974
		1	P-48 type	Patrol boat	1977
		24	Aérospatiale SS-12	SSM	1977
		1	Francis Garnier type	Transport ship	..
		1	Batral	Transport ship	..
		2	CN Darcachon	Patrol boat	1978
		4	SA-365	Helicopter	1979
		12	Alpha Jet	Trainer/atk aircraft	1980-81
		13	VAB	APC	1980
		7	ERC-90S Sagaie	AFV	1980
		6	M3-VDA	AA AFV	1980
		1	Alpha Jet	Trainer/atk aircraft	1983
	FRG/Netherlands	2	Fokker VFW F28	Transport aircraft	1977
		1	Fokker-VFW Maritime	Patrol aircraft	1978
	USA	2	Lockheed C-130H	Transport aircraft	1979

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Kenya	Canada	4	DHC-5D Buffalo	STOL aircraft	1977-78
	France	6	Aérospatiale SA-330L Puma	Helicopter	1978
	FRG	6	Dornier Do-28D-2	Transport aircraft	1978
	Israel	36	Gabriel-2	SSM	1982-83
	UK	3	HS Hunter FGA.9	Fighter aircraft	1974
		3	HS Hunter T.77	Trainer aircraft	1974
		4	Brooke Marine 39.5m/32m	Patrol boat	1974-75
		6	BAC-167 Strikemaster	Trainer/attack aircraft	1978
		2	BN-2A Defender	Transport aircraft	1978
		9	Scottish Aviation Bulldog	Trainer aircraft	1978
		..	Fox	AFV	..
		39	Vickers Mk3	MBT	1979-80
		60	Commander	Tank transporter	1979
		..	Swingfire	ATGM	1979
		12	BAC/HS Hawk T-52	Trainer/attack aircraft	1980
		..	Rapier	SAM	..
		42	Vickers Mk3	MBT	1981-83
		70	..	Towed Artillery	1983-84
	USA	12	Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II	Fighter aircraft	1977-82
		32	Hughes 500MD	Attack Helicopter	1979
		3100	MGM-71A TOW	ATGM	..
Mozambique	Netherlands	2	..	Parol boat	1980
	Portugal	7	Noratlas 2501	Transport aircraft	1978
	USSR	..	122mm MRL	Rocket launcher	1975
		40	T-34/54	MBT	1977
		20	BTR-40P	AFV	1977
		300	SA-7 Grail	SAM	1975-77
		3	Mil Mi-8 Hip	Utility helicopter	1978
		35	MiG-17 Fagot	Fighter aircraft	1978
		300	T-54/55	MBT	1978-85
		30	MiG-21MF	Fighter aircraft	1979
		..	MiG-23 Flogger	Fighter aircraft	..
		30	BTR-60P	APC	1981-83
		2	An-26 Curl	Transport aircraft	1981-82
		..	SA-3 Goa, SA-6 Gainful	AAM	1982
		1	An-26 Curl	Transport aircraft	1983
		..	BM-21 122mm	Rocket launcer	1984-85

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Nigeria	Austria	95	Steyr-4K 7FA	APC	1981-83
	Brazil	40	Aerotec T-23 Uirapuru	Trainer aircraft	..
	France	11	Aérospatiale SA-330 Puma	Meduim Helicopter	1977-78
		3	Combattante-3	Patrol boat	1980-81
		36	MM-38 Exocet	SSM	1981-82
		12	Alpha Jet	Trainer/atk aircraft	1981-82
		70	AML-60	AFV	1982
		595	Roland-2	SAM	..
		..	Milan	ATGM	..
	FRG	4	MBB BO-105	Utility Helicopter	1974
		1	Blohm/Voss	Frigate	1977
		2	Abeking & Rasmussen type	Patrol boat	..
		3	Fokker VFW F-27	Transport aircraft	1978
		2	Ro-Ro-1300	Tank landing ship	1979
		3	Lürsen S-143 type	Patrol boat	1980
		12	Alpha Jet	Trainer/attack aircraft	..
		1	Meko-360H	Frigate	1981
		3	Dornier-128-2	Patrol aircraft	1982
		6	Dornier-128-6	Transport aircraft	1982-83
	Italy	18	OTOMAT-1	SSM	1980
		5	Aermacchi MB-326GB	Trainer/attack aircraft	..
		16	Aspide	SAM	1983
		5	G-222	Transport aircraft	1983
		2	Palmaria 155/41	SPG	1983
	Netherlands	6	..	Patrol boat	..
		2	F-27 Maritime	Patrol aircraft	1983-84
	Sweden	12	FH-77 155mm	Towed artillery	1983
	Switzerland	57	Piranha	APC	..
	UK	20	Scottish Aviation Bulldog	Trainer aircraft	1973-74
		1	Bulldog class	Survey ship	1976
		20	Fox	AFV	1977
		20	Alvis Scorpion	AFV	1977
		2	Brooke Marine 33m type	Patrol boat	1977
		2	Vosper Thornycroft Mk 9	Corvette	1978-79
		36	Bulldog-120	Trainer aircraft	1978-..
		18	Short Seacat	SAM	1979
		49	Stormer	AFV	1982
		8	Jaguar	Fighter aircraft	1983

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
		..	Blowpipe	SAM	..
		8	Lynx	Helicopter	..
		21	Vickers Mk3	MBT	1983
		75	Saboteur	AFV	..
		..	Swingfire	AFV AT	..
	USA	4	Piper Navajo	Utility aircraft	1974
		6	Lockheed C-130H Hercules	Transport aircraft	1975-83
	USSR	..	MiG-17	Fighter aircraft	1974
		12	MiG-21MF Fishbed J	Fighter aircraft	1975
		..	K-13 Atoll	AAM	1975
		30	ZSU-23-4	SP AA gun	1977-79
		100	T-55	MBT	1979
Zaire	Canada	3	DHC-5D Buffalo	STOL aircraft	1976
	France	30	Aérospatiale SA-330 Puma	Utility helicopter	1974
		190	Panhard AML 60/90	AFV	1974-75
		14	Dassault Mirage 5	Fighter aircraft	1976
		20	Cessna-337 Milirole	Attack aircraft	1978
		4	AS-350	Helicopter	1982
	Italy	12	SIAI-Marchetti SF-260MC	Trainer/attack aircraft	1973-74
		3	MB-326GB	Trainer/attack aircraft	1979
		3	MB-326KG	Trainer aircraft	1980
		9	SF-260M	Trainer aircraft	1982
	Japan	2	Mitsubishi MU2J	Transport aircraft	1974
	PRC	25	T-59	MBT	1975
		20	T-62	MBT	1977
		2	SIAI-Marchetti	Patrol boat	1979
	USA	3	C-130 H	Transport aircraft	1975
		15	Cessna 310R	Utility aircraft	1975
		15	Cessna Model 150 Aerobat	Trainer aircraft	1976
		12	Northrop F-5E Tiger II	Fighter aircraft	..
		..	M113A1	APC	..
		1	C-130H	Transport aircraft	1977

TABLE 7-Continued

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Item	Description	Date of delivery
Zambia	Canada	7	DHC-5D Buffalo	STOL aircraft	1976
	FRG	10	Dornier DO-28 Skyservant	Utility aircraft	1974
	Italy	25	Agusta-Bell 205	Utility helicopter	1973-76
		8	SIAI-Marchetti SF-260S	Utility aircraft	1974
		6	Aermacchi MB326GB	Transport aircraft	1974
		10	Agusta AB-47G	Light helicopter	1977
	Sweden	20	MFI-17 Supporter	Trainer/attack aircraft	1977
	UK	..	Short Tigercat	SAM	1978
	USSR	>6	Mil Mi-6	Utility helicopter	1976
		8	T-54	MBT	1976
		20	BRDM	AFV	1976
		60	T-54/-55	MBT	1979-80
		30	BM-21, 122mm	MRL	1979-80
		..	SA-3 Goa/SA-7 Grail	SAMs	1979-80
		12	MiG-19	Fighter aircraft	..
		16	MiG-21F Fishbed	Fighter aircraft	1980
		..	T-55	MBT	1981
		3	Yak-40 Codling	Transport aircraft	1982

PRINCIPAL SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbooks 1977-86, (London and Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1977-86).

TABLE 8

STATE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFRICA 1978/1983

1978	1983
Pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninists	
Angola* Mozambique* Ethiopia*	Angola* Ethiopia*
Marxist or radical leanings	
Guinea	Mozambique*
Non-aligned - accept Soviet aid	
Ghana Zambia Nigeria	Ghana Nigeria Guinea Zambia
Non-aligned - no Soviet aid	
Kenya	Kenya
Anti-Soviet	
Ivory Coast Zaire	Ivory Coast Zaire

SOURCE: Tpyology derived from Colin Legum, "The USSR and Africa: The African Environment," Problems of Communism (January-February 1978): 11-2.

*These countries have signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

TABLE 9

SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES: 1974-78, 1979-83

	Angola	Ethiopia	Ghana	Guinea	Ivory Coast
Supplier relationship	P(USSR), P(USSR)	P(USSR), P(USSR)	M(West), P(GE)	S(USSR), P(USSR)	P(FR), P(FR)
Initial arms delivery	1975	1977	1961	1960	-----
Quantity of arms	High, High	High, High	-----	Low, Slight	-----
Quality of arms	High, High	Moderate, High	-----	Low, Low	-----
Transfer terms	Unfav, Unfav	Fav, Fav	-----	Fav, Fav	-----
Significant event	Yes, Yes	Yes, Yes	-----	No, No	-----
State orientation	Pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist	Pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist	Non-Aligned Accept Soviet Aid	Radical, Non-Aligned Accept Soviet Aid	Anti-Soviet
UN voting record	9/10, 9/10	6/10, 9/10	6/10, 6/10	8/10, 6/10	5/10, 0/10

TABLE 9-Continued

	Kenya	Mozambique	Nigeria	Zaire	Zambia
Supplier relationship	M(West), M(West)	P(USSR), P(USSR)	M(Cross), M(Cross)	M(Cross), M(Cross)	M(Cross), M(Cross)
Initial arms delivery	-----	1975	1967	1960	1976
Quantity of arms	-----	Med, High	Low, Low	-----	Low, Med
Quality of arms	-----	Mod, High	Mod, Mod	-----	Low, Mod
Transfer terms	-----	Fav, Fav	Unfav, Unfav	-----	Unfav, Unfav
Significant event	-----	Yes, Yes	No, No	-----	Yes, Yes
State orientation	Non-Aligned No Soviet Aid	Pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist, Radical	Non-Aligned Accept Soviet Aid	Anti-Soviet	Non-Aligned Accept Soviet Aid
UN voting record	7/10, 4/10	8/10, 10/10	7/10, 5/10	4/10, 1/10	8/10, 6/10

CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDIES

Angola

The official end of Portugal's colonial rule in Angola came on 11 November 1975. Independence found Angola's major internal political factions engaged in open civil war. Even prior to the granting of independence, armed conflict had broken out between the three principal guerrilla organizations participating in the independence struggle. These consisted of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The FLNA and UNITA, both pro-Western in their orientation, were provided material support and urged on by Mobutu of Zaire and his international patrons. The MPLA received its strongest backing from the Soviet Union.

Modest Soviet support to the MPLA dated from its formation in the early 1960s. In support of the independence struggle, many MPLA members received training in guerrilla tactics within the USSR. Soviet arms

equipped the majority of the MPLA's armed combatants. When the distrust which characterized the rival Angolan factions erupted into armed conflict in March 1975, the MPLA began to receive increased Soviet and Cuban military assistance.

In October 1975, units of the Republic of South Africa's armed forces pushed north from the Namibian border and moved to occupy southern Angola. Although ostensibly justified to protect South Africa's dam projects along the lower Cunene river, the advance strengthened the position of a loose alliance between the FLNA and UNITA in joint opposition to the MPLA. By 11 November, the MPLA controlled only a narrow area stretching across north-central Angola.[39]

In response to the South African intervention, and as a counter to intensified Chinese and United States military aid to the FLNA/UNITA coalition[40], the Soviets increased their arms shipments to a massive level. Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) aircraft brought military equipment from the Soviet Union by emergency airlift. Flight routing brought the Soviet An-12 and An-22 aircraft through Algeria and Congo-Brazzaville to Angola. Russian merchant shipping, loaded with arms and munitions, passed through the Congolese port of Ponite-Noire and then to Angolan ports.[41]

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[39]Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa, p. 12.

[40]In July, the U.S. responded to the urgings of Zambia and Zaire by approving a $14 million paramilitary program providing backing to the coalition.

[41]Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," Proceedings: Journal of the United States Institute, (April 1980): 55.

In 1975 alone, the Soviet Union supplied a total of $300 million in arms and military equipment to the MPLA, compared to $54 million supplied over the previous fourteen years.[42] The weapons that went to the MPLA included: small arms (SKS and AK-47 rifles); crew-served infantry weapons (recoilless rifles and mortars); T-34 and T-54/55 main battle tanks; 107mm and 122mm surface-to-surface rockets; armored personnel carriers (BTR-50/-60/-152); helicopter gunships (MI-8); MiG-21 fighter/bomber aircraft; and shoulder fired SAM-7s. The sophistication of hardware supplied to the MPLA did not distinguish it from previous Soviet activities in either the Third World or Black Africa. Yet, the quantity of assistance, surpassing all previous efforts to achieve Soviet foreign policy goals through military assistance, denoted a vastly different Soviet commitment in sub-Saharan Africa. Although not front-line equipment for Soviet forces, sophisticated weaponry, supplied in sufficient numbers, insured MPLA air and ground superiority.[43] By early 1976, the opposing forces of UNITA and the FLNA were broken. To avoid the superior strength of the MPLA, both opposition groups were forced to fall back on guerrilla tactics that they had employed in the anticolonial war. On 25 March, Pretoria announced that the last of its forces would be withdrawn from southern Angola. The military support provided by the Soviets and the 12,000 Cuban combat troops stationed in Angola proved to be critical elements in deciding the outcome of the Angolan

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[42]Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," Strategic Review, vol. IV, no. 3, (Summer 1976): 93.

[43]Report to the Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy", (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 107.

Civil War and the international debate concerning the future of an independent Angola.

In October 1976, the Soviets reluctantly committed themselves to a long-term relationship to the MPLA government with the signing of a 20-year Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty (which included clauses on military cooperation). Soviet reservations centered on a fear that Agostino Neto, the leader of the MPLA regime, might eventually follow the example of Egypt's Sadat: sign a treaty, accept Soviet aid for as long as necessary, and then expel the Soviets when their assistance was no longer needed.[44]

In the face of continued military incursions into southern Angola by South African air and ground forces operating from Namibia (aimed at guerrilla camps of the Namibian national independence movement, SWAPO) and the constant guerrilla attacks of UNITA and the FLNA, Soviet military support for Angola has not wavered. The New York Times reported that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Leonid F. Ilyichev, promised continued military aid during a five-day visit to Angola in May 1982. A year later, the Washington Post stated that Soviet leader Yuri Andropov had signed an agreement with President dos Santos pledging increased Soviet arms for Angola. As well as Soviet arms, the continued presence of significant numbers of Cuban troops (estimated at a level of 57,000 in 1988) have insured the survival of the MPLA from the threat posed by the guerrilla activity of UNITA. For both Soviet arms and the assistance of Cuban troops,

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[44]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Friendship Treaties with Third World Countries, Department of Defense Pubn. DOE-2200-75-80 (1980), p. 21.

Angola must rely upon hard currency earnings from oil and coffee production for payment.[45]

As a result of the 14-point peace proposal agreed to by South Africa, Cuba, and Angola in New York on 14 December of last year, conflict in Angola and along its border with neighboring Namibia is expected to be reduced. Two-thirds of the present Cuban force and all South African Defense Force troops are to leave Angola during 1989. Remaining Cuban personnel are to withdraw to the northern regions of Angola and totally return to Cuba by 1 July 1991. The three-power agreement, which will also lead to independence for Namibia, was made possible only by the mediation efforts of the United States and the behind-the-scenes influence of the Soviet Union.

After 28 years of conflict among its peoples, there are those who believe it is now possible to foresee peace in Angola's future. But, even if all foreign troops were to leave Angola, the Marxist regime of dos Santos will remain threatened.[46] The actions and interests of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi's UNITA, representing the greatest present threat to peace in Angola, were not addressed in the New York accord. President Bush has pledged continuing U.S. support for UNITA as long as the Soviet Union provides aid to the Marxists in Luanda. Only time will provide the answer as to the future role of the Soviet Union in Angola.

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[45]Washington Post, 5 June 1980, p. A29.

[46]Present Soviet troop strength in Angola is estimated at 2,500 personnel, East German forces between 600 and 2,500, and 2,500 North Koreans by Tony Banks. "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 September 1988, p. 551.

Ethiopia

Diplomatic ties between Ethiopia, Africa's oldest independent state, and the Soviet Union predated the Russian Revolution. In those years preceding the First World War, Czarist Russia maintained a permanent mission in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. Following the end of the Second World War, the legation of the Soviet Union was raised to the status of a full embassy. A state visit of the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1959 served as a landmark in the relations of the two countries. Emperor Selassie's visit represented the first made by an African head of state to the Soviet Union. The travels of the Emperor through Russia were concluded by the signing of trade, cultural and credit agreements. A $100 million loan to Ethiopia, provided for by the agreements, was one of the largest single credits granted to a Third World country by the Soviet Union until that time.

Prior to the Ethiopian Revolution, Soviet-Ethiopian relations reflected a lack of interest on the part of both parties to seek closer ties. The Soviet perception of Selassie's Ethiopia was one of a feudal state; all powers were retained in the person of the Emperor. Ethiopian ties to the United States, which included the granting of military basing rights and the lack of a "revolutionary element" in Ethiopian society, caused the Soviets to see little

promise of an Ethiopian turn to a socialist path.[47] Mistrust of Soviet intentions toward Ethiopia characterized Haile Selassie's diplomatic stance. The close ties maintained by Moscow with neighboring Somalia and the continued deliveries of Soviet military aid to that country, in the face of border skirmishes with Ethiopia, failed to assure the Emperor of Soviet goodwill. Soviet assurances of neutrality in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the disputed Ogaden region were no more reassuring.

The reign of Emperor Selassie came to an end in September 1974 following a period of rising unrest, strikes and demonstrations. The spread of disorder to the military and a series of mutinies within units of the Ethiopian armed forces led to the seizure of central authority by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (AFCC). The AFCC, renamed the Provisional Military Assistance Council (PMAC), took steps to dismantle the feudal system that had been maintained under the Emperor. Land reforms and the nationalization of elements of the business sector were quickly implemented. The PMAC shortly thereafter declared the formation of an Ethiopian socialist state with the eventual goal of establishing a communist order.

The period known as the "Red Terror" saw the elimination of a leftist civilian opposition which had made demands on the PMAC for a democratically elected civilian government. It is believed that in excess of 10,000 individuals, mostly in Addis Ababa, were detained and eventually put to death. Elimination of opposition, both civilian and within the ranks of the military, allowed the PMAC to establish complete control of the Ethiopian government.

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[47]Kagnew Station, in the Eritrean province capital of Asmera, was the largest U.S. military base in either Africa or the Middle East.

In late 1976, a PMAC delegation had returned to Addis Ababa from Moscow, having signed a secret agreement for the provision of military assistance. It is believed that the agreement was valued at $100 million and included only second-line, outdated equipment. This agreement came at a time of significant importance. In Eritrea, a northeastern province, a regional insurgency with a goal of obtaining autonomy was entering its 15th year. Formerly an Italian colony and subsequently annexed by Ethiopia, Eritrea's location controls Ethiopian access to the sea through the ports of Assab and Massawa. Composed of a majority of Muslims, the Eritrean Liberation Front was the recipient of diplomatic and limited military support from the Arab world. Within the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Somalia was covertly supporting the revolt of Somali inhabitants. These threats to the ruling regime of Ethiopia, the 'Dergue', were to become a turning point in the Soviet's role in Ethiopia.

Between the 1974 coup and 1976, American military assistance to Ethiopia continued uninterrupted ($26 million in fiscal year 1976). By 1976, however, serious difficulties arose between the United States and Ethiopia concerning the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program. The Ethiopian regime voiced its displeasure with higher interest rates, delays in deliveries, and an American refusal to replace ammunition stocks expended in its Eritrean fight. In April of the following year, all military assistance agreements with the United States were abolished and any further stationing of U.S. military forces in Ethiopia denied.

In July 1977, Somalia, sensing that Ethiopia was losing the fight to hold Eritrea and witnessing apparent disarray in Addis Ababa, attacked across the Ogaden in an attempt to reunite the ethnic Somali peoples. The

resultant combat with Ethiopian forces resulted in Ethiopia's ground forces being driven back deep within their own territory.

The diplomatic dilemma which confronted the Soviet Union in 1977 was to determine with which of the two warring states to side. Both states were socialist in their political orientation and both linked, in some manner, to the Soviet Union. Social and economic patterns in both states were evaluated in terms of their socialist advancement and political consequences. Somalia was found wanting when compared to the strides that had taken place in what had been a feudal Ethiopian state. The transformation that had taken place in Ethiopia in a relatively short period of time proved more attractive to the Soviet Union, which had maintained the hope of seeing a truly revolutionary regime established on the Horn of Africa.

The Soviets chose to resolve the issue by providing aid to the emerging socialist regime in Ethiopia. This was justified by Soviet claims that Somalia had committed armed aggression against Ethiopia, thereby forfeiting a right to Soviet aid.[48]

With the decided shift of support from Somalia to Ethiopia, the Soviet Union began massively equipping the Ethiopian armed forces with Soviet arms. A Soviet airlift, which utilized South Yemen as a major refueling and staging point, transported an imposing arsenal to Ethiopia. Military stores that began arriving in Ethiopia in late May 1977 included tanks, rockets, radar equipment, small arms, crew-served weapons and missiles. Later shipments included MiG-21 fighter aircraft. According to intelligence

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[48]Somalia had entered into a 20-year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1974. Four months after the initial invasion, the Somali government unilaterally abrogated the treaty, closed all Soviet facilities and ordered out all Soviet and Cuban personnel.

analysts, almost $1 billion in military arms were provided to Ethiopia between November 1977 and July 1978 alone. Not just the amounts of Soviet aid provided but, moreso, the speed with which the Soviets were able to mount the airlift operation received the rapt attention of Western intelligence agencies. During the highpoint of the initial Soviet airlift, Russian aircraft, including the giant AN-22, were reported to be landing in Ethiopia in twenty-minute intervals.[49]

In conjunction with the arrival of the much-needed Soviet arms was the arrival of thousands of Cuban troops to aid the Ethiopians in repelling the Somalis. The Cuban-Soviet buildup in Ethiopia resulted in over 9,000 Cuban combat troops committed to battle by March 1978, assisted by 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet military technicians. The major Somali maneuver elements were forced to retreat under this joint pressure, and on 9 March 1978, Barre of Somalia announced that he would withdrawal all his troops from the Ogaden region. Shortly after the withdrawal was completed, scattered guerrilla resistance in the Ogaden began.

Following the Somali retreat, Ethiopia's Mengistu sought to obtain further Soviet and Cuban aid for a move against the rebellion in Eritrea. The Cubans, who had supported the national liberation aims of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) prior to 1974, generally refused to add their support. Soviet advisors, however, provided the support assistance and tactical guidance required to pursue an Eritrean campaign. With Soviet backing, the

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[49]Robert Rinehart, "National Security," in Ethiopia: A Country Study, eds. Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 261.

Ethiopian armed forces proved successful in regaining all but minor portions of the territory that had been controlled by the guerrillas.

Continued Ethiopian offenses failed to quell the Eritrean resistance. Continuous fighting by the two major groups, the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front - Peoples' Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF), returned about 90 percent of the Eritrean countryside to the control of the guerrillas by 1984.[50] Guerrilla activity, sponsored by the Somali government in the Ogaden, flamed up on occasion since the defeat of the conventional attack of the Somali Army.

Today, the Ethiopian armed forces stand at about 250,000 troops, having increased in manpower since the end of the war with Somalia. The Soviet Union remains the major arms supplier. The Ethiopian military still finds itself engaged on a dual front against the northern secessionist groups, and in the Ogaden, against ethnic Somali guerrillas who remain active. Although the majority of Soviet military assistance was provided prior to and during Ethiopia's successful defeat of the Somali invasion, recent arms shipments from the Soviet Union have included modern first-line Soviet equipment: T-62 and T-72 main battle tanks, BMP-1 armored fighting vehicles, MiG-23 fighter bombers and MI-24 Hind combat assault helicopters. As a result of this aid, Ethiopia is estimated to have incurred a debt to the Soviets in excess of $2 billion.

The intention to establish long-term relations between the government of the Soviet Union and that of a "revolutionary" Ethiopia were achieved on 20 November 1978 with the signing of a 20-year treaty of

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[50]Peter Hellyer, "Eritreans Fight On in 23-Year Old War," Jane's Defense Weekly, 29 September 1984, p. 536.

friendship and cooperation. Both the continued mobilization of the ethnically diverse Ethiopian population to the cause of the "Ethiopian Revolution" and the creation of the Communist Worker's Party of Ethiopia in early September 1984 served to indicate the deepening commitment of Mengistu and his regime to the Soviet role model. That commitment has, in addition, been evident from Ethiopia's support of other Soviet client states and a condemnation of American foreign policy in general.

Ethiopia's support of the Soviet position in the world arena and their rhetorical attacks against the United States would appear to be partial payment for the massive debt owed the Soviet Union. Political support is not the sole payment made by the Ethiopians for Soviet arms. Although exact payment terms are unknown, general reporting indicates that repayment is being made by a combination of commodity exchange (coffee is Ethiopia's principal export) and hard currency payment.[51] Facility access granted to the Soviet military at the Dahlak Island anchorage and the airfield at Asmara is also considered repayment by many observers of Ethiopia.

There are reports that the Soviets are attempting to influence Ethiopia to reach an accommodation with its neighboring states and to persuade them to withdraw their support for the insurgent movements.[52] The publication African Confidential has stated that an Ethiopian delegation to Moscow was told by General Secretary Gorbachev, 'Our unqualified military and economic

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[51]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 327.

[52]Paul B. Henze, Ethiopia: Contrasts and Contradictions, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, [1987]), p. 4.

commitment cannot continue much further'.[53] The Soviet Union could be expected to benefit from an end to the Eritrean secessionist movement. Establishing internal peace within Ethiopia would assist the Soviets in their desire to stabilize Ethiopia under the Marxist regime. If these reports are true, the threat of cutting off the unlimited quantities of arms used for offenses in Eritrea might be the most influential instrument the Soviets could wield.

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[53]"Ethiopia: Dark Days for Mengistu," Africa Confidential, 17 February 1989, p. 2.

Ghana

Under Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, Ghana became the subject of intense Soviet interest. Nkrumah, as a respected voice of the nonaligned movement and African affairs, was a natural candidate for the attention of the Soviets. Just ten months following the granting of independence in 1957, diplomatic relations between Moscow and Accra were established. Strengthened ties between the two countries date from that time.

The coinciding of Ghanian and Soviet policies toward the crisis in the Congo served as a basis for more ambitious effort on the part of the Soviets and led to the rapid development of Soviet-Ghanaian relations towards the middle of 1960. Credit agreements were reached in August of 1960, representing only the second Russian loan to a sub-Saharan country. In 1961, following a visit by the then titular head of the Russian state, Brezhnev, Ghana was offered a nuclear reactor with Soviet assistance to meet their energy requirements.[54] A later state visit by Nkrumah to the Soviet Union underscored a definate shift in Ghana's foreign policy from a policy of nonalignment to a stance that clearly favored the Eastern bloc.

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[54]Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations, Vol. III of Soviet-Third World Relations. (London: The Central Asian Research Centre, 1974), p. 50.

Soviet-Ghanaian relations continued to expand following Nkrumah's pilgrimage to Moscow late in 1961. Nkrumah identified Ghana as being in agreement with the Soviet Union's position in world affairs. Ghana strongly supported Russian positions on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Berlin, Laos and Vietnam. Relations between the two ruling parties, the Soviet CPSU and Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP), developed as relations between the two countries strengthened. The CPP was represented by a delegation at the Twenty-second Party Congress of the CPSU in 1961.

The President listened frequently to the advice offered by the Soviets concerning the conduct of Ghanaian affairs. David Albright wrote that the Soviet ambassador in Accra had better access and more influence than many ministers and officials of Nkrumah's own government.[55] Of potential military value to the Soviet Union, Nkrumah permitted the Soviets to construct a monitoring station and a major airfield capable of handling jet aircraft on Ghanaian soil.

Close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Ghanaian armed forces, given the close political ties that existed, appeared inevitable. Yet, actual assistance provided during the Nkrumah era was only slight. Soviet military aid delivered to Ghana, mostly small arms, was no more than an estimated $10-$15 million. Despite a strong British tradition among the senior commanders of the Ghana[illegible].vices, small numbers of officers were sent to the Soviet Union for military training when Nkrumah accepted a Russian offer to train 100 members of the Ghanaian Army. Senior officers, antagonistic toward the Soviets and alarmed by the the President's

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[55]Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, p. 10.

willingness to become dependent upon the Soviet Union, were unable to prevent an increase in that number.[56] By 1966, it was estimated that 1,000 Ghanaian army cadets were under training in the USSR. The number of Soviet military personnel stationed within Ghana grew rapidly so that by 1966 an estimated one thousand were present. Many of those were engaged in the operation of guerrilla training centers established by Nkrumah in 1961 to combat the forces of "colonial Imperialism."

The position of influence that had been earned by the Soviets in Accra was eroded following a military coup on 24 February 1966. The empowered National Liberation Council (NLC) took immediate measures to limit ties that had been established with the communist bloc. More than 600 Soviet technicians were expelled; communist trade missions were closed; economic and other aid programs were suspended. Diplomatic relations between the two states were maintained, but at a new low-keyed level.

Maintaining the pledge made at the time of the takeover, the NLC returned Ghana's government to civilian authority in October 1969. Relations with the Soviets had the outward appearance of slight improvement with the return of civilian rule. Although new aid and cultural agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and Ghana, no significant improvements were made.

Military rule returned to Ghana in a bloodless coup in January 1972; the military justified their actions by citing civilian inability to create economic growth and curb corrupt practices. Successive military leaders

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[56]Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Relations, (London: Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1977), p. 85.

were themselves unable to curb the rampant corruption in which senior military officers were major participants.

On 4 June 1979, a popular coup led by junior officers and noncommissioned officers established itself as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings served as its chairman. Later in that same year, civilian rule was once again returned under a constitution modeled after those of Western democracies. Those characteristics that had defined post-independence Ghana (a continued decline in the economic sector and perpetual corruption) gave rise to a return to power of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings and a small group of active and former military members in 1981.

The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), established by Rawlings in that year, professed "revolutionary comradeship" with Libya, Cuba and other "progressive governments." The PNDC has also declared a desire to maintain friendly relations with all states, regardless of national ideology. Criticism by Flight Lieutenant Rawlings of the "neocolonialists" and their actions in Africa, as well as the "antirevolutionary" elements within Ghana, have served as an invitation once again to the Soviets to cement closer ties. The Soviets have reacted cautiously to the opportunity provided by the "progressive" Rawlings regime. The political instability associated with successive Ghanaian governments may have proven that the prospects for a true socialist revolution in Ghana are not worth the substantial investment required.

Guinea

Guinea's nationalist leader, Sekou Touré, gained early Soviet interest by defying France with a Guinean demand for immediate independence in 1958. As the only French colony to refuse membership in the Greater French Community, Guinea became the target of French economic and diplomatic recrimination. Western countries, the United States included, hesitated in offering support to an independent Guinea for fear of offending a NATO ally. Lacking developmental capital and the technical expertise required to run a country, Touré turned immediately to the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. Yet, the close relationship that was to develop between the Guinea and the Soviets was due to pragmatic decision-making by Touré as much as to any ideological affinity for the Soviet cause.

Perceiving the vacuum created by the hasty withdrawal of the French and potential returns from the many independence movements elsewhere on the continent for their support to Guinea, the Soviets made immediate offers of economic and military assistance.

In March of 1960, Guinea became the first black African state to accept military aid from the Soviet Union.[57] Following the transfer of two

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[57]Vivian Turnbull and Brian Powers, "Arms for Access: Or There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch," (Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 1983), p. 37.

shiploads of small arms and ammunition by Czechoslovakia to Guinea, the Soviet Union assumed the role of the dominant patron for equipping the military, police and militia forces in Guinea. As a result of a 1960 arms agreement (including a credit for $3 million), Guinea received both MiG fighter aircraft and World War II tanks. By early 1961, military officers and technicians, in large numbers, were sent to the Soviet Union for training in the operation and maintenance of new equipment as it was being introduced into the Guinean armed forces. In the following years, Soviet and Guinean military delegations were exchanged and, presumably, were responsible for negotiating continuing Soviet military assistance. Between the granting of independence and 1970, military aid provided by the Soviet Union amounted to an equivalent of $25 million.[58]

As a response to an unsuccessful raid by insurgents on the capital in November 1970, Soviet arms assistance increased both in qualitative and quantitative terms.[59] A deployment of Soviet naval vessels off the coast of Guinea began in December of the same year.

The position of Guinea along the coast of West Africa provided the Soviets with strategic air and port facilities. Soviet technicians, completing major improvements to the Conakry-Glessa airport, made available a facility that allowed regular overflight of the southern and middle Atlantic by Soviet long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft (Tu-95). Port access approved by

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[58]Harold D. Nelson, ed. Area Handbook for Guinea, 2nd rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 340.

[59]Although the details of the event remain either conflicting or unknown, a United Nations' mission of inquiry concluded that the attack had been controlled by the Portuguese Army. The intended goal of the assault was the release of Portuguese prisioners held in Conakry. Other members of the force were members of a Guinean exile opposition group desiring to overthrow the government.

Guinea was decisive, later, in permitting Soviet support to reach the MPLA during the Angolan Civil War.

By 1978, the highpoint of Soviet-Guinean relations had passed. The Guinean leadership was frustrated with Soviet failures to complete many aid projects, both economic and military. Disagreement over Soviet prices paid for Guinea's bauxite (a barter agreement for Guinea's arms debt) also served as a focus of conflict between the two nations. As a result, Soviet access rights were severely curtailed in 1977. Although remaining a major supplier of military hardware, Soviet weapons deliverie to Guinea have represented a negligible amount since Sekou Touré distanced his government from Moscow over these disputes.

On 11 October 1984, official Conakry radio announced that the Soviet Union had signed a $102 million loan agreement with the government of Guinea, gaining a share of Guinea's bauxite production in return. This loan (brought about by the new military government following the death of Touré in March 1984) may underscore an end to the cool relations that have existed between the two countries since 1978.

Ivory Coast

In contrast to its rivals in West Africa, Guinea and Ghana, the Ivory Coast's relationship with the Soviet Union has been strained at best. Since independence in 1960, President Houphouet-Boigny characterized Russian actions on the African continent as meddlesome, deceitful and treacherous; the Soviets charge Houphouet-Boigny as an agent of France's neo-colonialism.[60] It was not until 1967 that an agreement was reached establishing diplomatic relations between the two states. The first Soviet ambassador arrived in the capital, Abidjan, at the end of the year. Relations with the Soviet Union were severed in 1969, following a Soviet news release sharply critical of Ivory Coast policies. In the absence of official relations, both countries felt free to criticize the actions and policies of the other. Diplomatic ties were not restored until February 1986 after an 18-year break.

The armed forces of the Ivory Coast numbered 8,200 men in 1982. The army constituted the primary arm of the military, divided into three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, one airborne battalion , and

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[60]McLane, Soviet-African Relations, p. 74.

one company each of reconnaissance, armored cavalry and engineers. The air force of 450 men was equipped with five Alpha Jets as combat aircraft, and numerous transport helicopters and light aircraft. Small coastal patrol craft were the major vessels of the navy. A paramilitary force and gendarmerie were also incorporated as forces answering to military command.

The foreign policy of the Ivory Coast under Houphouet-Boigny has been characterized as pragmatic, conservative and, although having differed in a number of important aspects from that of France since independence, pro-French. The Ivory Coast's commitment to close cooperation with France is evident in the equipment of its armed forces. France represents the predominate supplier of military aid to the Ivory Coast. A bilateral defense agreement signed with France in 1961 provides backing for the Ivory Coast's forces. Joint military exercises are held to test the effectiveness of mutual defense arrangements and command structure.

Even today, President Houphouet-Boigny persists in his wariness of communism, underscoring it as a threat to the independence of African nations.

Kenya

With independence for Kenya in 1963, a cordial diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union was established. An official Kenyan delegation departed Moscow in April of 1964 with a promise of $45 million in economic aid, one of the single largest credits provided by the Soviets during the 1960s.[61] The credits were intended to fund development projects ranging from a hospital to a technical institute. Economic credits were followed by an arms agreement in the same year.

Favorable relations with Moscow became strained in 1965 by the strengthening friendship developing between the Soviet Union and Kenya's neighbor to the north, Somalia. The two countries were then engaged in recurring border disputes resulting from the irredentist claims of Somalia for regions of northern Kenya which they claimed were unjustly denied them by pre-independence accords.

The growing Soviet military assistance program to Mogadishu was the focus of the gravest concern in Nairobi. Arms transfers to Somalia and other dissatisfactions with Soviet ways led to a Kenyan refusal to accept the delivery of Soviet arms under the 1964 agreement. A 17-man technical

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[61] Ibid., p. 75.

team which had accompanied the shipment were ordered to return to Moscow. In response to these actions, the Soviet Union cancelled the total arms agreement.

Correct routine contact under two Kenyan presidents has marked the strained relations that have existed between the Soviets and Kenya since 1965. Under Daniel Moi, only small-scale economic aid and scholarships for professional students have been accepted from the Soviet Union.[62] Following the Soviet invasion of Afganistan in 1980, Moi sharply criticized Moscow. In Soviet eyes, the Western orientation of Kenya's foreign policy and, moreso, the granting of limited military access to the United States precluded the possibility of closer ties with Moscow.

Following independence, the United Kingdom was the most important provider of military assistance to the fledgling Kenyan armed services. At present, Great Britain maintains strong ties to Kenya's military through the execution of joint training exercises and by providing positions for Kenyan students at British military schools. Additionally, Britain continues to serve as an important source of arms and military equipment.

Soviet arms transfers to Ethiopia lead Kenya to regard American arms and support as a necessary counterweight. Beginning with the delivery of F-5 Freedom Fighter aircraft to the Kenyan Air Force in 1977, the United States assumed a major role as a military supplier to Kenya. The 1980 Facilities Access Agreement, permitting the limited U.S. access to Kenyan port and airfield facilities, has in part been paid for with the guarantee of continued U.S. Military Assistance Program funds. As in the United Kingdom, Kenyan

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[62]Jean R. Tartter, "Government and Politics," in Kenya: A Country Study, ed. Irving Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 229.

military personnel attend U.S. military institutions to receive both professional and technical training.

The Kenyan government maintains arms transfer relations with a number of other Western countries. Even following a break in diplomatic relations resulting from the 1973 war, Israel continued to cooperate with Kenya. In 1982, they provided technical assistance to mount the Gabriel missile system to coastal patrol craft of the Kenyan Navy. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada have also served as sources of military equipment to Kenya.

Mozambique

Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975. Independence followed a negotiated cease-fire between Portugal and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), a nationalist guerrilla group which had received significant military support from the Soviet Union since its organization in 1963. Since the granting of independence, the ruling FRELIMO party continued to rely upon the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations for the supply of military equipment.

In 1975, the Mozambique transitional government was the recipient of Soviet 122 mm MRLs and SA-7s SAMs. In May 1976 in Moscow, President Machel of Mozambique entered into a bilateral accord with the Soviet Union which provided for additional Soviet military aid. Soviet arms deliveries quickly increased following the signing of the agreement. One-fifth to one-fourth of Soviet cargos passing through Mozambican ports consisted of weapons and other military stocks.[63] By the end of the year, African analysts were reporting that the newly established government had offered naval and aircraft basing rights in exchange for continued Soviet military aid. President Machel justified the increased militarization of

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[63]Irving Kaplan, et al. Area Handbook for Mozambique, 2nd rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 206-7.

Mozambique to defend his nation from the cross-border raids staged by the Rhodesian Armed Forces. Soviet arms transfers included armored fighting vehicles, MiG-17/-21 fighter aircraft, air defense systems, SA-3 and SA-7 SAMs, field artillery pieces and coastal patrol craft.

The signing of the Soviet-Mozambique Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in March 1977 formalized the relationship existing between the two states. Although pledged to cooperate in economic and technical sectors and to expand trade and shipping, the military aspects of the relationship are paramount. Only small amounts of the $100 million in Soviet-East European economic aid committed had been delivered by 1980.[64] The failure to meet Mozambique's expectations has led to Moscow's loss of political ground with this African client. To meet Mozambique's needs for economic development assistance, Machel turned to the United States and other Western countries. Most major economic aid programs are now financed by the Scandinavian countries; others are sponsored by Great Britain.

While ineffective in meeting the economic development needs of Mozambique, Soviet security assistance ties have remained in place. Mozambique continues to pay for Soviet military assistance through exports and by allowing the Soviets to fish in their waters.[65] The intensification of the guerrilla war with the anti-communist Movimento Nacional da Resistencia (MNR) in 1982 resulted in a series of high-level military

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[64]U.S., National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries: 1979 and 1954-1979, Central Intelligence Agency, ER80-103180. (Washington, D.C.: N.P., 1980), p. 39.

[65]Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," International Security, VI, (Spring 1982): 164.

cooperation talks between the Soviet Union and Mozambique.[66] In November, Defense Minister Dmitiri Ustinov and Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, met with President Machel. In December, the head of the Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff toured through Mozambique as the senior member of a visiting delegation. During the same period, the chief of the Mozambican Air Force was holding consultations with his counterparts in Moscow.

The formal security agreement signed by Mozambique with South Africa on March 16, 1984 and the lifting of a seven-year old ban on direct economic assistance by the United States signaled a possible new direction for Mozambique's foreign affairs. A shift from close association with Moscow's dictates in exchange for expanded economic and security aid from the Western bloc might hold in the future.

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[66]U.S., Congress, House, The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980-85, p. 239.

Nigeria

For a period of many years, ties between the U.S.S.R. and sub-Saharan Africa's most populous state, Nigeria, were hampered by that state's strong ties with Great Britain and the West. Offers of Soviet aid following Nigeria's independence in 1960 were repeatedly turned down by the government in Lagos. It was not until the summer of 1964 that the first permanent Nigerian diplomatic mission to the Soviet capital was established.

Soviet-Nigerian relations changed materially with the coup conducted by Ibo officers in January 1966, the counter-coup, and the outbreak of civil war. Dissociating the Soviet leadership from the cause of Ibo separatism and the state of Biafra, the Soviet Union provided unequivocal support to Colonel Yakuber Gowan's attempts to retain national unity.

When traditional Western arms suppliers proved unreliable, the Soviets offered needed weapons and military advisers. In July 1967, following the outbreak of ethnic strife, a high-ranking Nigeria[illegible]elagation concluded a crucial arms agreement with the Soviet U[illegible] Six Czechoslovakian L-29 jet trainers equipped for ground attack missions

arrived at Lagos in August.[67] They were followed in short order by ten to fifteen MiG-17s and fifty Soviet instructors.

Contrasting with earlier Soviet provision of arms to Africa, military equipment and supplies provided to Nigeria were sold on a commercial cash basis. It is presumed that the Soviets may have intended to offset charges of interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria by not offering such equipment under loan agreements as it had with Guinea and Ghana.[68]

Providing the arms which permitted the Nigerian central government to prosecute its war against Biafra formed the basis for increasingly stronger relations between the two nations in other areas. Shortly after the struggle to establish an independent Biafra had ended, the Nigerian Ambassador to Moscow stated that Soviet aid had been "more important than any other single thing . . . more than all other things together."[69] In the years immediately following the civil war, Soviet-Nigerian relations were characterized by a sense of obligation and marked by active cooperation with the Soviet Union by a grateful Nigeria. Soviet arms transfers during the civil war preceded the signing of a cultural pact, the acceptance of Soviet technicians and the start of economic cooperation, credit and assistance activities from the East.

The persistent hostility of Nigeria's diplomatic actions towards the white regime in the Republic of South Africa justified, in Russian eyes, their

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[67]Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa, p. 88.

[68]Ibid.

[69]New York Times, 21 January 1970.

large commitment in Nigeria; this commitment was greater in 1973 than in any other sub-Saharan nation.[70]

Military arms and assistance served as the Soviet's introduction into relations with Nigeria and remains the most significant aspect of relations between the two countries. The first deliveries of Soviet arms in August 1967 were accompanied by 200 Soviet technicians. During the three years of the Biafran crisis, the Nigerians were provided with a dozen reconditioned MiG-17 fighter aircraft; numerous artillery pieces and anti-aircraft systems; and coastal patrol craft. The transfer of arms and Russian military presence was subsequently reduced following the end of the civil war.

Nigeria's non-aligned stance toward world affairs has not prevented it from turning to the Soviets for modernization of its military forces. In 1975, Nigeria took delivery of MiG-21 aircraft to replace earlier generation MiGs. Although satisfied with Soviet equipment brought into their inventory, the Nigerians have shown displeasure with the Soviet technicians who were to instruct them in its use and maintenance. In 1979, the New York Times reported that dissatisfaction with Soviet advisers led the Nigerian government to reduce their total number from forty to five.[71] Problems of language, a condescending attitude toward Nigerians, and incompetence not only in training skills but in the operation and maintenance of actual

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[70]McLane, Soviet-African Relations, pp. 105-6.

[71]Fredrick Ehrenreich, "National Security," in Nigeria: A Country Study, 4th rev. ed., ed. Harold D. Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 268.

equipment have been associated with Soviet instructors assigned to Nigeria.[72]

Nigerian resentment of the Soviet failure to consult with the OAU or Nigerian leadership prior to taking action on the African continent (Angola, Ethiopia-Somalia) and the Nigerian unwillingness to adopt a socialist ideology continue to prevent a dominant Soviet influence in Lagos.

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[72]Author, personal conversations held with Nigerian military officers while assigned to the American Embassy in Lagos as the Chief of the Security Assistance Office, 1986-88.

Zaire

Soviet actions in 1960 to bolster the position of Patrice Lumumba, the pro-Soviet and first Prime Minister of an independent Congo (Zaire), included for the first time an implicit threat of military action outside of an acknowledged sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Frank Church, the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, marked the political and international strife within Zaire as "the beginning of a diplomatic struggle between the United States and Russia for the control of Africa, in which both sides continue to engage to the present day."

In July 1960 following the granting of independence to the former Belgian Congo (Zaire), President Patrice Lumumba requested arms assistance from the Soviet Union to permit him to take military action against the secessionist state of Katanga. Prior to the United Nations taking action to block further Soviet assistance, small arms, 100 military cargo vehicles and an associated repair workshop were delivered.

Following Lumumba's murder by political rivals, Russian influence in the Congo centered on support of Lumumba's successor, Antoine Gizenga. Lumumba's protege lacked the former leader's charisma and was unable to transfer to himself the international support that Lumumba had gained. From 1960 to 1965, successive, antagonistic Congolese governments served

to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a position of influence within Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).

By the time that President Mobutu assumed power in 1965, relations between the Soviet Union and Zaire were poor at best. Continued Soviet backing of rebel forces in various regions of Zaire served as a principal element of discord between the two countries and dominated Kinshasa's relations with the Eastern bloc. Any possibility of rapprochement with the Soviets was further put asunder by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Russian support of the MPLA in Angola, and Zairian suspicions that the Soviet Union, together with the Cubans, had engineered the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province.

While Zaire, under Mobutu, has distanced itself from the Soviet bloc, assistance from the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been looked upon with favor; Mobutu has viewed China as a counterweight to rising Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Relations with the PRC have remained cordial since Mobutu returned in 1973 from a state visit to Peking with a Chinese promise of $100 million in economic aid. Peking provided small arms and relief assistance to Zaire during the last invasion capitalizing on Zaire's mistrust of Moscow.[73]

At independence, Zaire's military was most influenced by Belgium, the former colonial power. Since withdrawal of the United Nations' forces following the domestic turmoil that earmarked the immediate post-independence period, Western sources have served in the main to equip and

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[73]Margarita K. Dobert, "Government and Politics," in Zaire: A Country Study, 3d rev. ed. H.M. Roth, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 101-2.

train Zaire's military forces. Belgium has directed its aid to ground force support, Israel trained Zaire's airborne element, Italy structured the Zairian Air Force, and the United States concerned itself with overall logistical matters.[74]

In pursuit of a foreign policy of nonalignment, Zaire has accepted military assistance both from the PRC and North Korea. In the 1970s, prior to Mobutu's support of the pro-Western UNITA/FLNA coalition in Angola, North Koreans were responsible for the training of Zaire's Kamonyola Division.

Regarding Zaire's political stability and economic potential as important to the region, Zaire has become a major focus of United States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. The United States' bilateral economic and military aid to Zaire has amounted to more than $800 million since the granting of independence in 1960. President Mobutu has frequently supported the positions assumed by the United States within the international arena and within the context of United Nations and OAU debate.

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[74]Ibid., p. 254.

Zambia

Soviet interest in Zambia, whose location would assist Moscow in attaining a central role in the opposition to white minority rule in Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, was taken for granted as Zambian independence approached in 1964. Soviet interest in Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's President, was further enhanced when, on the eve of independence, he stated his intention to direct Zambia along the road of socialist development.

Following independence, Kaunda's slow pace in diversification of Zambia's economic activity to lessen the dependence on the minority regimes in southern Africa disillusioned many Soviet observers. Likewise, Zambian criticism of Soviet actions relating to two international issues, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Russian support of the Nigerian central government in its fight to retain Biafra, fostered an ambivalent Soviet assessment of Zambia's foreign and domestic policies. President Kaunda characterized Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia as "childish and stupid" and the involvement of the Soviet Union in Nigeria as unwanted interference.[75]

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[75]McLane, Soviet-African Relations, p. 174.

The end of hostilities in Nigeria in 1970 allowed a reappraisal of existing relations on the part of the Soviets and Zambia. As Zambia took an increasingly militant line against Portuguese colonialism (Angola and Mozambique) and Ian Smith's white-rule in Rhodesia, Soviet commentators assumed a more sympathetic position toward Kaunda. Soviet willingness to assist Zambia in countering security threats posed by frequent cross-border incursions was signaled by Marshall Grechko's invitation to the Zambian Defense Minister to visit the Soviet Union in the spring of 1971.[76]

The security threat faced by Zambia led to vastly increased defense expenditures. Annual military outlays increased by 400 percent between independence and the early 1970s and the manpower serving in the armed forces rose from 5,000 to 16,000 during the same period.[77]

Zambia's foreign policy, despite an improving relationship with the Soviet Union, reflected a determined attempt to maintain a non-aligned stance in the world arena. The Peoples' Republic of China granted Zambia substantial economic development aid as well as equipment. The United States provided more than $21 million in bilateral economic aid and even greater amounts of Export-Import Bank loans. The former colonial power, Great Britain, was relied upon for the majority of military arms and equipment requirements.

Relations with the Western powers soon came to be strained by the apparent reluctance of Great Britain and the United States to take decisive action following the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia and

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[76]Ibid.

[77]Joseph P. Smaldone, "Historical Setting," in Zambia: A Country Study, 3rd rev. ed., ed. Irving Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 43.

against the African colonial policy of their NATO ally, Portugal. Particularly galling to Kaunda was the failure of the United States to enforce the United Nation's sponsored embargo of Rhodesia.

In 1978, Zambia's support of Zimbabwean guerrillas against the Rhodesian regime (granting refuge to ZAPO) made it a target for air attack by Rhodesian forces. On October 19, 1978, Rhodesian aircraft attacked a ZAPO compound located 130 kilometers inside Zambia's borders. Hundreds were killed and wounded, including guerrillas, Rhodesian refugees and Zambian nationals. The attacks, which continued for three days, escalated to the use of airmobile forces which conducted mop-up operations in the wake of the airstrikes. The cross-border operations underscored the fact that Rhodesian forces were capable of striking out at Zambia with relative impunity.

In response to the Rhodesian raids, the British government provided almost 100 tons of military equipment by grant after receiving assurances from Zambia that such aid would be for defensive purposes only and not transferred to the national liberation movements. President Kaunda condemned the Western response, including that of Great Britain, as failing to have given anything "real" and threatened a shift toward the Soviet Union and Cuba, who were "ready to help." Zambia's inability to garner support from the West forced it to reconsider Communist offers of assistance to upgrade its defense forces.

In 1980, Soviet "help", an agreement amounting to $85.4 million in arms and equipment, was announced in Lusaka, Zambia's capital.[78] The

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[78]Edward J. Laurance, "Soviet Arms Transfers in the 1980s: Declining Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World, ed. Bruce E. Arlinghaus (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 47.

agreement provided 16 MiG-21 fighter aircraft in 1980. The Washington Post reported that, in exchange for the aircraft, the Soviets demanded 20 percent down with the remainder of the costs being paid over a seven-year period with interest rates established at a commercial level.[79] Further deliveries of main battle tanks (T 54/-55), armored fighting vehicles and other major items of military equipment followed in 1981.

The signing of the agreement has not been automatically viewed by analysts as granting the Soviets political leverage in Lusaka. President Kaunda, precisely because there is a fear of this occurring, has been particularly suspicious of Soviet activities.

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[79]"Zambia Buys Soviet Arms Valued at $85 Million." Washington Post, February 8, 1980, p. 22.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

Within the range of foreign policy instruments available to the Soviet Union (political, economic and military), it is military assistance, that has been most evident in the Soviet Union's dealings with sub-Saharan Africa. As the primary instrument for the achievement of Soviet objectives in Africa, the transfer of military capability has often been decisive in creating diplomatic opportunity for the furtherance of Soviet aims. The sale of arms and military equipment and the stationing of military advisers have served as a means to gain entrance and develop contacts otherwise unavailable to Soviet advances. Additionally, Soviet support bases and port facilities found within this strategic region may be directly attributed to a willingness to engage in arms transfers.

The question remains as to how effective this trade in arms has been in gaining of political influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It is, of course, difficult to determine how much of any gain in influence can be attributed to this single factor. The earlier review of voting practices within the United Nations General Assembly depicts that governmental responses are influenced by a wide ranging set of determinants. It would appear to be a

difficult task to establish the relative value of a specific factor to any given vote. Yet, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to formulate a generalized conception of the influence played by the same factor.

It was proposed in the hypotheses that a state receiving military aid from the Soviet Union exclusively would tend to support that nation's position on political and security issues within the United Nations General Assembly. Guinea represented the single case state that maintained a sole supplier relationship with the Soviet Union for the purpose of meeting its security needs during either review period. Yet, the voting record of Guinea, when compared to a number of those nations that maintained arms agreement ties with Western countries (Nigeria, Zambia and Ghana), differed no more than two votes (in support of the Soviet position) out of a total of the twenty reviewed.

A survey of the case studies of Soviet arms relations with African countries would suggest that support of Soviet positions on issues within the United Nations is not necessarily consistent with the level of arms transferred. Despite having been the recipient of substantial quantities of modern Soviet weapons and technical assistance, a number of the case nations did not refrain from differing with the position taken by the Soviet Union on specific international issues. The most visible example that can be cited is the Soviet failure to mobilize support against the 1983 resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afganistan. With the exceptions of Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, all case states aligned themselves in opposition to the continued presence of Soviet forces in that country.

If a position of influence is gained by the transfer of Soviet arms, it appears to be with those nations in which a short-termed dependency has

been achieved. Three states were distinctive in that their voting records within the United Nations appeared to be patterned after that of the Soviet Union. Angola and Mozambique mirrored the Soviet vote on eighteen of the twenty resolutions. Angola was absent or abstained on two of the recorded votes (U.N. Budget and Chemical Weapons), while Mozambique was absent once and voted once against the Soviet Union (Transfer of Real Resources and U.N. Budget). Ethiopia's record was one in which they were absent on three occasions (Nuclear Collaboration with Israel, Procedural Vote On Israeli Resolution, and Israeli Credentials) and chose to vote opposite the Soviet on two issues (Transfer of Real Resources, U.N. Budget)

Within each of the three cited countries, the ruling regimes were subject to imminent military threat from either or both internal forces and external actors. In the case of Angola, the continued insurgency mounted by UNITA and the border incursions in the south by South Africa's armed forces posed a perpetual threat to the authority of the MPLA. The renewed efforts of the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia to gain regional autonomy confronted the 'Dergue' with similar circumstances. Mozambique's Marxist government was subject to a reign of terror and economic warfare unleashed by the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). The campaign of the MNR had brought the violence close to Maputo, the capital, with the government showing little capability to curb the insurgency.

In each of these cases, the ability to restructure military forces and arms relationships in line with suppliers other than the Soviet Union were constrained. Each state had but to review the difficulties experienced by Egypt, following its ouster of the Soviets, to understand the short-term complications that could be anticipated with such a decision. At a time of immediate threat, none could afford a degrading of military capabilities.

This holds true even under the assumption that alternate sources of similar military hardware were immediately available. Hence, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique found themselves obligated to meet the expectations of their Soviet patrons at least in terms of United Nations debate. This represented a small price to pay to ensure the continued flow of necessary arms needed to retain the position of central authority within the respective countries.

The extent to which the remaining case study nations supported the Soviet Union on political and security issues within the United Nations, if not a factor of Soviet arms transfer patterns, remains the outcome of some other influence. It would appear that the Soviets have succeeded in identifying itself with those same themes expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement. In her testimony before the American Congress, Ambassador Kirkpatrick identified the Non-Aligned Movement as the single most important bloc operating within the framework of the United Nations organization.

Founded in the times of Nehru, Tito, Nassar and Nkrumah, the Non-Aligned Movement has since grown to include 100 of the 158 member nations of the United Nations. This same organization includes all African states other than the Republic of South Africa. The apparent cohesion of the Non-Aligned Movement and specifically its African Bloc is worthy of further study.

What then can be concluded from this research is only that recipients of Soviet military aid are more likely to avoid confrontation with their patron over issues brought before the United Nations when faced with immediate armed threat to regime survival.

This finding has implications for American foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than a willingness to provide sophisticated weapons to the African continent in an attempt to counterbalance Soviet transfers, the

interests of the United States would be better served by finding means to reduce the African need for arms. Reducing the demand of African states for security assistance from external powers should be an emphasis of America's foreign policy in Africa. American assistance should seek to strengthen regional institutions for the peaceful resolution of disputes as well as to build political consensus among African states. The Soviet Union has capitalized on Africa's political instability and regional conflicts to gain influence through the provision of arms. Over the long-term, U.S. support of initiatives by African nations to resolve local disputes through peaceful means and within African councils will reduce opportunities for the Soviet Union to add to the influence they have gained through the transfer of arms.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Selected Resolutions of the 33d Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Resolution 33/174 -- Establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Chile: Establishes a voluntary fund for aid to "persons whose human rights have been violated by detention or imprisionment in Chile:" singles out Chile for this purpose without reference to the severe human rights problems existing among numerous other U.N. member states.

Resolution 33/71-A -- Review of the Implementation of the Recommendation and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session: Part A: "Military and Nuclear Collaboration with Israel:" Requests the Security Council to call on all states to refrain from supplying military goods of any nature whatsoever and to "end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material" to Israel; requests the Security Council to establish the necessary enforcement machinery

Procedural Vote on 33/71-A -- Asked the General Assembly to declare a resolution on "Military and Nuclear Collaboration with Israel" an "important question" within the meaning of Article 18, requiring a 2/3 majority.

Resolution 33/136 -- Acceleration of the Transfer of Real Resources to the Developing Countries: Urges all developed countries to exert "all their efforts" to attaining the .7% ODA target, including such means as setting aside 1% of annual GNP increase for the purpose of augmenting ODA.

Resolution 3/147 -- Assistance to the Palestinian People: PLO-sponsored resolution calling on the UNDP to consult with "specialized agencies and other organizations" in programs to improve conditions of the Palestinian people.

Resolution 33/115-B -- International Relations in the Sphere of Information and Mass Communications: Affirms the need to establish a "new, more just and more effective world information and communications order" which is based on the "free circulation and wider and better balanced dissemination of information.

Resolution 33/148 -- United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy: Calls for convening under U.N. auspices an international conference on the following energy sources: solar, geothermal, wind power, tidal power, wave power, and thermal gradient of the seas, biomass conversion, fuel-wood, tar sands, and hydro-power.

Resolution 33/40 -- Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interests Which are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People's in Southern Rhodesia and Nambia and in All Other Territories Under Colonial Domination and Efforts To Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid, and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa: "Strongly condemns" the U.S. and Israel, inter alia, for "collaboration" with South Africa.

Resolution 33/205-A -- Program Budget for the Biennium 1978-1979: Increased the amount $996,372,900 appropriated by resolution 33/180A by the amount of $93,740,600.

Resolution 33/29 -- The situation in the Middle East: Condemns Israel occupation of Arab territories and calls for a Geneva peace conference with representation of all parties including the PLO.

TABLE 10

THIRTY-THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY SELECTED VOTING PROFILE: 1978

	33/174	33/71A	33/71Pro	33/136	33/147	33/115B	33/148	33/40	33/205A	33/29
Soviet Union	Yes	Yes	No	Abs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Angola	Yes	Yes	No	Abt	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Abt**	Yes
Ethiopia	Yes	**Abs**	**Abs**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes
Ghana	Yes	**Abs**	**Abs**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes
Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes
Ivory Coast	Yes	**Abs**	**Yes**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Abs	**Yes**	Abs
Kenya	Yes	**Abs**	No	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes
Mozambique	Yes	Yes	No	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Abt**	Yes
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	No	**Yes**	**Abs**	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes
Zaire	**Abs**	**Abt**	**Abt**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Abs**	**Yes**	Yes
Zambia	Yes	Yes	No	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes

Note: Bold print represents votes differing from that of the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX B

Selected Resolutions of the 38th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Procedural Vote -- Accept Israeli Credentials

Resolution 38/180-E -- The Situation in the Middle East: "Demands" that all states, particularly the United States, refrain from taking any step that would support Israel's war capabilities and consequently its aggressive acts, whether in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 or against countries in the region.

Resolution 38/29 -- The Situation in Afganistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: "Calls for the Immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afganistan."

Resolution 38/3 -- The Situation in Kampuchea: Urges "that to bring about durable peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problems that will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure respect for all the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well as the right of the Kampuchean people to sel-determination free from outside interference."

Procedural Vote -- Gag Grenada Debate

Resolution 38/7 -- The Situation in Grenada: "Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenda, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, soverignty and territorial integrity of that state."

Resolution 38/187-C -- Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons: Requests the Secretary-General to pursue actions in reference to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Resolution 39/101 -- Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in El Salvador: Urges "the Government of El Salvador to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens and to assume its international responsibilities in this regard by taking the necessary steps to ensure that all its agencies, including its security forces and other armed organizations operating under its authority, fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms": Urges "all states to abstain from intervening in the internal situation in El Salvador."

Resolution 38/39-G -- Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa: "Condemns the actions of those transational corporations that continue, through their collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa, to enhance its military and nuclear capabilities as well as the failure of the government of the countries of those coporations to take effective action to prevent such collaboration in accordance with relevant resolutions of the U.N."

Resolution 38/39-A -- Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa: Condemns "in particular, the increased collaboration by the Government of the United States of America with the racist regime of South Africa in pursuance of its policy of so-called "constructive engagement" which has encouraged the racist regime to entrench apartheid": Condemns "the increasing collaboration by Israel with the racist minority of South Africa, particularly in the military and nuclear fields."

THIRTY-EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SELECTED VOTING PROFILE: 1983

	Motion	38/188E	38/29	38/3	Motion	38/7	38/187C	38/181	38/39G	38/39A
Soviet Union	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Angola	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	**Abs**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia	**Abs**	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ghana	**Abs**	Yes	**Yes**	**Abs**	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guinea	**Abs**	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ivory Coast	**Yes**	**Abs**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**No**	**Abs**	**Yes**	**Abs**	**Abs**	**Abs**
Kenya	**Yes**	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Abt**	**Abt**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nigeria	**Abs**	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Abs**	Yes	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zaire	**Yes**	**Abt**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Abs**	**Abs**	**Yes**	**Abs**	**Abt**	Yes
Zambia	**Yes**	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Bold print represents votes differing from that of the Soviet Union.

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